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ABSTRACT
As the economic, political, and technological landscape of America’s healthcare
management system changes, states are forced to grapple with the progressively arduous
task of administering substance abuse treatment programs. Using the Open Systems Model,
this research examines external and internal environmental factors that influence goal
displacement as it is hypothesized to occur in states’ treatment delivery systems. The
findings suggest that a mix of environmental characteristics affect states’ levels of goal
displacement but the factors that predict displacement in alcohol treatment are different than
for the delivery of drug treatment. The internal and external environment factors that
contribute to goal displacement do not remain static but are dynamic. Goal displacement
was found to be relatively stable in delivery of alcohol treatment but volatile for that of drug.
The findings also suggest that volatility impedes the achievement of goals, and the more
heavily bureaucratized a state, the greater its level of volatility.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The purpose of this thesis research is to examine, using the Open Systems Model, the
external and internal environmental factors that influence the delivery of substance abuse
treatment among the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia. This work will also seek
to discover if the effective delivery of states’ substance abuse treatment is obstructed by
state bureaucracy, specifically, by the phenomenon of goal displacement. The theoretical
framework of the research will be laid by providing meanings to the concepts of
organizational goals, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as the complexities involved in
the measurement of organizational effectiveness. An additional exploration of the inherent
dysfunctions of bureaucracy will also be addressed. The changing and incongruent internal
and external task environments that a bureaucracy operates within and the economic forces
that shape the ways in which state governments deliver their substance abuse treatment will
also be discussed.
As the continuing war against drug and alcohol abuse escalates and the costs of
healthcare skyrocket, greater citizen and government concern over the financing,
administration, and evaluation of substance abuse treatment programs have also intensified.
A projected $18 billion was allocated to alcohol and drug treatment in 2001 (U.S. DHHS
2005). In 2002 it was estimated that 9.4 percent of the population aged twelve and older
were afflicted with a substance abuse disorder (U.S. DHHS 2003), yet for years 2002 to
2004, only 1.5 percent of that population segment received treatment (U.S. DHHS 2006). In
2004 and 2005, 86.6 percent of the population aged 18 and older and having some type of
insurance coverage was not in need of substance abuse treatment, whereas 74.4 percent did
require treatment (U.S. DHHS 2007). For the identical years, 31.2 percent of the adult
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population in need of specialty substance abuse treatment failed to receive care because they
lacked health insurance (U.S. DHHS 2007).
Public sources fund a substantially greater proportion of treatment than do private
sources and studies indicate a growing reliance on publicly financed treatment and
reductions in inpatient costs (U.S. DHHS 2005). Compared to other health care disorders,
persons suffering from substance abuse addiction and dependency are, to a greater extent,
reliant upon public financing. Of the $18.3 billion spent on drug and alcohol treatment in
2001, state and local governments comprised the largest source of funding, 38 percent,
followed by Medicaid at 19 percent (U.S. DHHS 2005). Among the 50 U.S. states, an
average 13.1 percent of budgets are spent on substance abuse-related problems. In 1998,
approximately ninety-six cents of each state substance abuse expenditure dollar was spent to
deal with the extra burden addiction places upon states’ criminal justice, education,
Medicaid, and social services programs, while the remaining four percent was appropriated
directly toward treatment and prevention (CASA 2001). Therefore, it is crucial for state
governments, policy-makers, and other interested stakeholders to advance their knowledge
and understanding of what factors influence and how policy decisions affect the delivery of
treatment so that knowledge can be used to enhance the state-level organization and delivery
of alcohol and drug prevention and treatment by narrowing the gap between research and
practice.
As the economic, political, and technological landscape of America’s healthcare
management system changes, states are forced to grapple with the progressively arduous
task of administering substance abuse treatment programs. Faced with rapidly rising health
care costs, rigid budgetary constraints, and citizen criticism for increased governmental
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accountability, states, in the pursuit of an economically efficient administration, are now
turning to the privatization of public services and to managed behavioral health care
systems. But does the delivery of social welfare programs become more efficient when its
administration is removed from the hands of the state and passed into the arms of the private
sector? Is additional effectiveness attained?
However, as states possess unique cultural and political characteristics, not all
administration processes or outputs are alike. Considerable variation exists among states in
the administration of the federal Medicaid program (Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt
1991; Barrilleaux and Miller 1988; Schneider 1988; Schneider and Jacoby 1996), social
welfare programs (Dawson and Robinson 1963), Social Security Disability (Keiser 1999),
child support enforcement (Keiser and Meier 1996; Keiser and Soss 1998) and in the
financing of substance abuse programs (CASA 2001; Culhane, Hadley, and Lutterman 1992;
Dayhoff, Pope, and Huber 1994). Suffice it to say that how an individual state administers
its social services programs, such as substance abuse treatment, is contingent upon a whole
host of factors. Yet which factors predict the success or failure of a state to meet the
treatment needs of its substance abusing populations? For an illustrative comparison, what
accounts for 9.58 percent of Nebraska’s citizens to report needing but not receiving
treatment for alcohol abuse and West Virginia’s 5.64 percent? (Wright 2002). Likewise,
what impact does Delaware’s $31.34 per capita spending for substance abuse prevention,
treatment, and research have on the state’s treatment performance as compared to
Colorado’s mere $0.14 (CASA 2001)? Does this difference make Delaware’s delivery of
treatment more effective than Colorado’s? And what other types of factors can impede or
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facilitate the delivery of effective treatment and how is effective or inadequate treatment
defined and measured?
It is questions such as these that will be addressed in the subsequent body of research.
External and internal environmental factors that influence the delivery of substance abuse
treatment will be examined with a special emphasis on how government bureaucracy may
stifle the effective delivery of treatment and, ultimately, diminish performance.
First, a literature review will address the theoretical examination of organizational goals,
efficiency, and effectiveness, and the phenomenon of goal displacement. This will include
conceptualizations and empirical measurements of goal displacement as defined in previous
research. Studies of state-level administration of public programs which focus on factors
that shape bureaucratic output will be reviewed, as well as research that pertains directly to
the delivery of substance abuse treatment. Specific to treatment delivery will be studies
pertaining to the implications of ownership and performance of substance abuse
organizations and the effects of the growing phenomenon of managed care. Chapter Three
will address the research design. Here, it is from the literature review that goal displacement,
as the dependent variable, and the factors that influence it, the independent variables, will be
operationalized. Precise measurements for each variable will be explained and the
hypotheses formulated. In Chapter Four the research method will be explained. The
statistical procedures for this quantitative research will be discussed in detail. Results from
the analyses will be presented and discussed in Chapter Five. The paper will conclude by
discussing ways in which the research adds to the existing body of knowledge of how a
state’s internal and external environment affects its delivery of substance abuse treatment.
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As LaPorte (1994: 7) so astutely stated regarding our knowledge and understanding of
the conduct of public organizations, “We know less of what we need to know, even as we
know more than we did.”
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Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature
The following literature review will supply the framework from which the research
design will be constructed. Our overall concern here is with identifying organizational
effectiveness. We begin with a brief overview of public bureaucracy, focusing on
dysfunctions and pathologies that can emerge in such entities, and how they can inhibit
organizational effectiveness. Next, building on the initial overview, a review of the
scholarly literature on the concept of the organizational goal, exploring how displacement
has been defined, and what constitutes organizational efficiency and effectiveness will be
provided. It will also consider the use of the Open Systems Model, which academics have
theorized is most appropriate for studying organizational effectiveness and goal
displacement.

An Overview of Bureaucracy
In our contemporary times, the term “bureaucracy” frequently carries a negative
connotation, calling to mind images of long lines at government agencies, red tape, lack of
governmental oversight, and excessive government waste of tax monies. Is government
both efficient and effective, or maybe just efficient and not effective? The answer may
likely depend on a nation’s or a state’s current social, political, and economic climates.
Perhaps those little irritating characteristics of bureaucracy are simply the price we pay for
both efficient and effective government administration, that necessary evil.
For Max Weber, one of the foremost theoretical founders of organizational theory,
bureaucracy was the compulsory means to attain the ends of the state. In the modern world,
governance based on goal-oriented rationality was much more efficient than governance
grounded in tradition. The functional value of bureaucracy was its capacity to optimize
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efficiency (Jain 2004). Through the impartial application of Weber’s characterization of
bureaucratic traits, specialization, hierarchy, rules, managerial discretion, impersonality, and
careerism, efficiency would be achieved, for without bureaucracy, the bustling train of
government administration would be inept in its delivery of intended services or goods.
However, Weber understood only too well that bureaucratic efficiency would bring with it
burdensome costs to society. Those costs, the annoying, maddening, or perhaps even
enraging actions and behaviors we observe in bureaucratic organizations today, could be
branded as acts of maladministration. But whether the act of maladministration be
inflexibility, indifference, fraud, or lack of transparency, the unintended consequences of
bureaucracy often lead to the same dysfunction: the capital and labor energies allocated for
the attainment of organizational objectives get deliberately or unintentionally averted to
other means, thereby resulting in the displacement of original goals.
Later scholars of organizational theory, such as Robert Merton, Philip Selznick, C.
Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, and Alvin Goulder, and most notably, for the purposes of this
intended research, Roberto Michels, were critical of Weber’s failure to take note of several
unintended consequences, or latent functions (Merton 1968) of bureaucratic structures.
They saw it necessary to study the resulting dysfunctions of “officialdom” and its impact
upon organizational effectiveness (Mohr 1973).
Idyllically, bureaucracy is designed to efficiently function as a means to serving society.
But does it? Our recent history is rife with examples of ineffective and inefficient,
overburdened, error-ridden, and poorly administered public bureaucracies: Hurricane
Katrina and the resulting FEMA debacle (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007), the
mismanagement of the Walter Reed VA hospital (Priest and Hull 2007), the alleged
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destruction of CIA-coerced interrogation tapes (Eggen and Warrick 2007), and, most
recently, the alleged abuse of power by Housing and Urban Development Secretary
Alphonso Jackson (Leonnig and Eggen 2008). Regardless of the circumstances, the result is
the same: the ineffectual delivery of public services. The intended outcomes are
compromised or totally averted, replaced by calculated or inadvertent wayward motives.
This phenomenon has been referred to as “goal displacement.”
But before examining the specific bureaucratic dysfunction from which the following
research will evolve, the meaning of the term “organizational goal” will be offered, and the
implications of measuring effectiveness and efficiency will be discussed, thus providing the
framework from which the following research will be based upon.

Goals
An organization, public or private, for-profit or non-profit, is a cooperative social unit,
formed to achieve some collectively acknowledged purpose, a specific goal. Accordingly,
goals function to provide directional courses of activities by illustrating a desired set of
conditions by which the social unit endeavors to achieve. Serving as touchstones to measure
accomplishment, goals also serve as a basis of legitimacy that authenticates organizational
behaviors (Etzioni 1964).
What exactly is an organizational goal? What internal and external conditions are
conducive to the presence of goals, and what typical or atypical conditions necessitate
conspicuous or merely plausible goals? Mohr (1973) addressed these types of questions in
his review of previous literature on the concept of the organizational goal in order to
postulate “a more concrete and comprehensive conceptualization” of the organizational goal
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(1973:470). Arising from the analysis, Mohr classified goals of two types, transitive and
reflexive. A transitive goal is the outward function, or output of an organization’s
endeavors. External in nature, it is transitive in that the output, produced by the organization
impacts society. It is the claimed intent, or “ends” of the association, while a reflexive goal
is one that is “internally oriented,” or what the organization does for itself in order to survive
(Mohr 1973).
Rather than utilizing Mohr’s typology of goals, transitive and reflexive, Perrow (1961)
opted to label the two types as “official” and “operative,” respectively. An official goal,
similar to that of Mohr’s transitive, pertains to the “end” to which the organization strives to
attain via its formal operating policies. Similar to the reflexive goal, the operative is the
“means” employed that seek the “ends” of the organization. It is the behavior of the
organization, reflective of the interests and beliefs that are commonly held by and internally
associated with the members of the group, malapropos as to whether those “means”
processes sustain or subvert the declared organizational aspirations.
Associated with the official goal are the “output goals,” the product or service that is
delivered externally upon society. Conversely, and parallel to Mohr’s reflexive goal, is what
Perrow (1961) branded “support goals,” the goals connected with acquiring the conditions
conducive to self-maintenance, or, more aptly stated, continued existence. Whereas official
goals are largely shaped by the expectations of society, operative goals are a function of the
agency or entity bureaucrats, induced by individual member characteristics, group think, and
“the unofficial uses to which they put the organization for their own needs” (1961:857).
Simon (1964) discussed the question of whether the goals of an organizational member
mirror those of the organization, postulating that distinguishing between the two is
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necessary, for it avoids the assumption that the existence and performance of the
organization is autonomous of its members. However, when speaking of the goals of
management, it is assumed that those organizational goals are determined by the top echelon
when, in fact, the observed goals do not reflect those of the top decision-makers but are
products of other forces, the convergence of individual behaviors at all stratums. For this
reason, Simon (1964) elected not to conceive of an organizational goal as what Etzioni
defined as “a state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize” (Etzioni 1964:6) but
as a set, or sets, of constraints an association encounters in its quest for its aspirations.
It is the value premises of goals that function as inputs to decisions, while motives, as
causes, drive the particular selection of value premises amongst organizational members.
As Simon (1964) aptly stated, “One man’s goals may be another man’s constraints”
(1964:8). Due to the tortuously dependent connection between goals and motives, the
acceptance of collective decisions is based upon satisfying an entire set of requirements that
minimize the conflict of interest between personal and role-defined goals that exist
psychologically within each participant. A civil servant has an organizational interest in
administering a public service yet has a personal stake in preserving his/her tenure and/or
status of power and prestige. Simon (1964), utilizing Pareto optimality, suggested that an
organization’s courses of action are a function of its constraints whereby the inequalities
amongst them are minimized for any desired outcome.
Thompson and McEwen (1958) viewed organizational goals as dynamic, a state of affairs
that are constantly transformed as the internal necessities of the firm and its environmental
influences change. Goal setting is a repetitive process of “redefinition” and
“reinterpretation” of organizational goals. However, the more unstable the environment, the
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more difficult it is to redefine and reinterpret the firm’s objectives. An environmental factor
that influences the goal setting process is competition. Competition occurs in an
organization’s quest for economic resources, public acceptability, clientele, and in the public
arena, among agency bureaucrats, legislators, and government leaders, in their pursuit for
budgets and conflicting ideologies. A complex interrelated web of relationships necessitates
negotiation, or bargaining among the parties, thus resulting in one of many of what Simon
(1964) termed “constraints.”
Therefore, the identification of explicit goals is, often times, in the eyes of the beholder.
Is the goal of a correctional facility rehabilitation or is it custody? Is the primary goal of a
teaching hospital to heal its sick or to teach neophyte physicians? And how are conflicts
such as competing goals reconciled? Is the primary concern of a public administrator
his/her agency’s efficiency or its effectiveness? The answers are largely dependent upon
which subset of stakeholders is asking the question. One’s man’s effectiveness may be
another man’s efficiency. As such, organizational effectiveness, as with the recognition of
goals, is determined by which subset of stakeholders does the asking.

Efficiency and Effectiveness
Efficiency may be considered as “doing things right” whereas effectiveness is “doing the
right thing,” The effectiveness of an organization may be measured by how well it achieves
its goals, as lofty a proposition as that may seem. Efficiency, on the other hand, is
determined by the optimal allocation of resources required to generate a given level of
output (Etzioni 1964). The most desirable condition results in both a high degree of
effectiveness and efficiency, yet often times the two conditions are exclusive of one another.
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Efficiency may restrict the range of organizational activities while the variety and scope of
operations targeted toward effectiveness tend to be large (Etzioni 1964). Therefore, as the
capitalistic West has borne witness, efficiency tends to be achieved at the expense of
effectiveness, cost savings at the price of quality.
The more restricted and tangible the output or goal, the easier it is to measure and
evaluate efficiency. Similarly, the more abstract an organization’s goals, the more difficult
it is to assess change and thus the less likely outcome evaluations are to be conducted
(Shipman 1969). The perceptions of management also play a role in perceived
organizational effectiveness. Contrary to their hypothesis, Lan and Rainey (1992) found
public managers’ perception of their goals as clearer than those of private managers but also
more difficult to measure. Predictably, a statistically significant positive correlation was
found between perceived goal clarity and perceived organizational effectiveness. The
clearer the goals, the greater management’s perceived effectiveness.
The evaluation of abstract goals, such as the amelioration of complex social problems,
crime, racism, drug addiction, and poverty, proves especially problematic (Bohte and Meier
2000). The interconnectedness of a societal system is highly intricate, making the
determination of any causal relationship virtually impossible. Because societal functioning
is exceedingly dynamic and the assessment of effectiveness is often a continuous process,
the evaluation of an abstract social problems is imprecise. The selection and assignment of
proper indicators of organizational achievement is critical, for emphasis on some, and the
disregard of others may result in substantial misrepresentation of organizational goals
thereby thwarting the efficiency and effectiveness that the social unit strives to achieve
(Etzioni 1964). It is not uncommon for organizations to have multiple goals with varying
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degrees of concreteness (Warner and Havens 1968). Likewise, procedures and standards for
assessing specific programs can differ significantly from agency to agency (Bohte and Meier
2000).
The most common indicator of public agency effectiveness is the evaluation of its
outputs (Barnekov and Raffel 1990), a practice that is hypothesized to induce a bureaucrat to
maximize outputs (Bohte and Meier 2000). Examples are the documenting of the number of
clients served in a social services program or arrest rates in police work. Evaluating outputs
may be indicative of efficiency, yet it does not necessarily reflect effectiveness. For
example, the number of substance abuse patients treated does not necessarily reflect
recovery rates, nor do arrest rates reflect conviction rates. Measuring performance based on
outputs rather than outcome encourages bureaucrats to overemphasize the number
generating input processes of a public organization in order to appease higher-ups (Bohte
and Meier 2000). Waegel (1981) found this to be true of detectives. The primary concerns
of investigative police work were promptly turning out reports and making arrest quotas.
Also, the implementation of performance criteria may impel bureaucrats to fixate on efforts
that would enhance output numbers rather than focus on the true mission of the agency
(Blau and Meyer 1971; Downs (1967) quoted in Bohte and Meier 2000).
Inputs are concrete and easily measurable, yet, they too, are rarely indicative of the
desired social outcome. Administrative expenditures are often used as a measurement of
output. Keiser and Meier (1996) and Keiser and Soss (1998), in their studies on agency
enforcement of child support, utilized expenditures as a measurement of input and found
positive correlations between monies expended and number of dollars collected, as well as
number of processed claims. However, Machado (2001), in research on substance abuse
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programs’ effectiveness, found no link between expenditures and outcome, as measured by
abstinence rates, thus discrediting the belief that increased spending on public programs will
somehow make them more effective. Financial resources may better equip the public
agency to carry out its functions, as in the case of child support, but in other instances, as
with substance abuse, program effectiveness is contingent on an infinite number of
influencers, not necessarily dollars inputted.
Therefore, efficiency does not necessarily imply effectiveness nor effectiveness indicate
efficiency. Efficiency is getting the job done at the best cost possible. Effectiveness is
getting the job done properly. Weber apparently did not make the distinction between the
two; bureaucracy served as a means to optimize efficiency (Jain 2004). Efficiency may be
foremost in the mind of the public administrator, but for the taxpayer, it is most likely to be
effectiveness. However, due to the complexity of social issues that public agencies are
forced to address and because of the many social, political, and economic constraints, or
what Bohte and Meier (2000) termed “bottom lines,” that they have to contend with, the
effectiveness of public programs is especially difficult to assess, making for the construction
of straightforward quantitative performance measurements “almost impossible” (Bohte and
Meier 2000).
In addition, public administrative processes are shaped by the internal characteristics of
the bureaucracy and the external characteristics of its environment (Keiser and Soss 1998).
Given the multifarious nature of evaluating bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, the
evaluation of organizational goals solely in and of themselves without regard for the
interaction and interdependence between the organization and its environment would be
meaningless. Organizational theorist Talcott Parsons (1956) believed organizations to be
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best studied using an open systems model. Thompson and McEwen’s (1958) concept of an
organizational goal lends itself to employing the open systems model because goals are
products of the interactions that takes place “both within the organization and between the
organization and its environment” (1958: 28-29). Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) also
supported the open systems model in the study of organizational effectiveness.
Therefore, the study of organizational effectiveness necessitates more than just a
unilateral examination of an organization’s goals, but an assessment of a firm’s external as
well as internal environment. In addition, one must examine not only the organization’s
“official” goals, but the means in which they are achieved, or the “operative goals.”
Explicit goals lack the specificity necessary to explain the “throughputs” (Keiser 1999), or
processes by which organizations attain both official and operative goals. For this reason,
the Open Systems Model will be used as a framework from which the following research
will be constructed.
The following section will briefly discuss the origin of the term “goal displacement.” It
will also include a discussion of how operative goals displace the official goals of an
organization and the subsequent consequences.

Goal Displacement
An organization, once created, begins to gather its own requirements, whereby these
needs, or means, acquiring command over the ends, replace the goals. In the processes of
formulating and allocating resources towards goal achievement, group members develop
vested interests whereby they begin to conserve, defend, and expand the organization
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regardless of its original mission (Merton 1957; Perrow 1961; Blau and Scott 1962; Selznick
1966; Etzioni 1964; Warner and Havens 1968).
The term “goal displacement” was first penned by Roberto Michels in his research on the
pre-WWI behavior of the German Social Democratic Party. Formed to advance the
Socialist revolution, the Socialist parties and labor unions, as voluntary associations, sought
to create democratic administration in authoritarian nations. The creation of party and union
organizations necessitated leadership; however, the leaders soon acquired vested interests in
safeguarding their leadership roles because lack of doing so would have returned them to
their lowly status of the rank and file, a revisit to their former physically laborious jobs, and
to loss of income, status, power, and prestige (Etzioni 1964). Michels observed that through
the development of defense strategies, the control of information, communication, and the
management of overly zealous conformists and unruly dissenters, the leaders were able to
maintain their positions of power, yet, in the process, the democratic goals of the
organizations had been supplanted by the development of a structurally dictatorial
administration, an oligarchy. Fearful of government intervention, management grew less
and less inclined to operationalize revolutionary activities that may have jeopardized the
organization’s survival and instead concentrated its activities on the development of an
efficiently run bureaucracy (Michels 1962, Etzioni 1964).
Michels (1962) noted that as an organization grows in size and scope, a monopolization
of power initiates at the top of the hierarchy, widening the gap between management and the
rank and file wherein goal displacement occurs. Leaders’ access to privileged knowledge,
control of communication, and proficiency in politicking provide an insidious dominance
over other plebian members who they fear may seek to gain control.
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Another type of goal displacement, as described by Merton (1957), occurs within the
body of public and private organizations but takes place in a more innocuous and
unintentional manner. A bureaucrat, as a highly disciplined and practical rational actor and
in strict adherence to rules, in his or her overemphasis of rule observance, displaces the aims
of the organization with that of the means. Conformance to prescribed procedures
develops, resulting in role rigidity, maladaptive behaviors and often times ritualism wherein
the goals of the bureaucracy are obscured or discarded (Merton 1957, Etzioni 1964). This
type of routinization was documented by Waegel (1981) among detectives in investigative
police work.
Similar to the means-ends inversion of goal displacement is goal diversion whereby
stated goals are rejected and superseded by alternative objectives (Warner and Havens 1968,
Alexander 1976). An organization’s obsession on internal strife or specific problems may
force it to turn inward upon itself in its search for solutions, resulting in the formation of
intermediary goals that are irrelevant to its official goals (Etzioni 1964). It is this type of
goal displacement that is most frequently observed in the study of goal displacement.
Goal displacement is a consequence of transformations that take place between the
original goals and internal factors such as organizational structure, group members, or faulty
goal-setting processes. Displacement can occur as a result of many causes, the power of
interest groups, internal or external to the organization, the ambiguity of stated goals,
modifications in management philosophy, or a forced change in members’ belief systems
(Perrow 1961; Warner and Haven 1968). External factors such as associations with other
individuals or groups or environmental circumstances may also contribute to goal
displacement (Alexander 1976). These internal and external factors that place additional

17

demands upon an organization are collectively identified as the construct of “task
environment.” The terminology will be used to categorize the independent variables that
will be hypothesized to predispose a state bureaucracy to goal displacement. Structural
demand conditions, internal to the bureaucracy, are defined as internal task environment,
while the environmental demand conditions are identified as external task environment.
As an organizational phenomenon, goal displacement may be best described as a
“syndrome”. From a definitional point of view, goal displacement is not a precise term but
an obscure condition that may be used as a theoretical construct to explain the failure of an
organization to meet its stated goals. In the research on organizational effectiveness and
efficiency, the application of goal displacement to illustrate organizational dysfunction is
highly variable and liberally defined. Displacement may be intentional or accidental, but its
occurrence is most often documented in public organizations, or bureaucracies. A public
bureaucracy is a goal-oriented organization and, as research has illustrated, prone to goal
displacement because of its overemphasis on efficiency, coupled with a lack of public
accountability. Additionally, “The daily decision making of those who work in complex
organizations is shaped more by power structures, ingrained routines, and established
resource configurations than by current scientific findings” (Rosenheck 2001:1608).
Following Weber’s ideal, each piece of paper a bureaucrat shuffles, each “t” that is
crossed, and each “i” that is dotted is related to the attainment of a public organization’s
stated goals. Idyllically, every procedure and rule has a specific meaning and purpose with
the ultimate goal of serving the public trust. But why are some bureaucracies better at
attaining their goals than others? The difference can be attributed to levels of endogenous
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and exogenous factors that shape bureaucratic processes, which then influence the degree of
goal displacement that a particular public organization experiences.
As nearly any non-attainment of organizational goals may be construed as an act of goal
displacement, the phenomenon has been conceptualized in the research literature in a variety
of ways. The following section will demonstrate how goal displacement has been defined in
the literature and how internal and external demand conditions, or “task environment”
(Keiser 1999; Keiser and Soss 1998), influence its development. For the specific purposes
of this thesis work, no previous research was found regarding the presence of goal
displacement within the realm of substance abuse treatment delivery. However, a wide
variety of previously conducted research that is functional in providing the framework for
this thesis work will follow the discussion of goal displacement as a construct.

Conceptualizations and Empirical Measures of Goal Displacement in the Literature
This section will illustrate how goal displacement has been characterized in the research
literature. Internally, the phenomenon has most often been attributed to structural sources
related to members’ belief systems, lack of adequate resources, and multiple conflicting
agendas. Externally, it is influenced by environmental conditions.
Within public service environments, several studies have operationalized goal
displacement as the resulting condition of subjects not having received intended care,
training, or treatment. Scheff (1962) documented a conflict between custody versus
treatment goals in a mental hospital. The official goal of the hospital was the symbolic
transformation of client status from one of inmate to that of patient, but because this reform
had been initiated from the top down, it was met by resistance from the staff. The operative
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goal among staff became that of retaining former procedures whereby the necessary
symbolic division between staff and patient was maintained. The official goal of the
hospital did not conform to the belief system of the staff and was therefore disregarded and
supplanted for procedures that did support prevailing staff convictions. Scheff (1962)
concluded that when goals are unclear, displacement is inversely related to level of contact
between management and subordinates and that the need for distinct status relationships is
conducive to goal displacement. Marcos (1988) cited several historical incidences of the
deliberate displacement of goals within psychiatric bureaucracies for the purpose of
sociopolitical power and control wherein the operative goal of custody supplanted the
official goal of treatment.
Maintaining control over unruly and often disobedient youth overrode the intended goal
of preparing adolescents to become productive, socially mobile members of society in
Aviram’s (1990) study of Israeli boarding schools. The Israeli government sought to
advance disadvantaged Jewish youth both socially and academically by removing them from
their homes and placing them in boarding schools amongst administration and staff that
were entirely committed to achieving the goals of the state. The boarding school operated
with multiple goals, functioning not only as a school but also as a residential, occupational
training, and counseling facility, each with its own stratum of personnel, academic
instructors, housefather and mothers, vocational and agricultural teachers, and social
workers. Aviram (1990) observed high levels of stress among staff members as they were
overwhelmed by their numerous duties and few gratifying accomplishments. Staff’s
fixation on the disparaging lower class characteristics of their students translated into low
expectations for their academic achievement, whereby the development of mutual mistrust
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between student and staff soon followed. Because of unmanageable student behavior, staff
was forced to place greater emphasis on control and discipline processes, and hence system
maintenance, rather than on the formally stated goals of improving student social mobility
and equalization. Therefore, the organization was overburdened by an overwhelming
internal task environment, the strain of multiple goals, and the prevailing depreciative
attitudes of the staff.
Goal displacement has also been documented as having occurred when public service
endeavors ultimately fall victim to commercial entrepreneurship. Scott (1967) studied the
displacement effects on the belief systems of staff in the Pre-Depression sheltered
workshops for the blind. Never intended to function as a commercial for-profit business
enterprise, the original goal of workshops was to afford the blinded a social welfare service
and to provide purposeful and gainful employment and assimilation into the sighted
population. The workshops realized “moderate success” up until the mid to late 1920s
when attempts to rectify the nefarious economic effects of the Depression with a more
concentrated focus on preserving business operations resulted in further erosion of
organizational goals. Operations further assumed the functions of a full-fledged business
whereby the belief system of the staff towards the needs and wants of the blind were soon
altered. As the effects of the Depression deepened, former attitudes of the meritorious idea
of full integration of the blind into the community fell away, with many believing not all
blinded individuals were suitable for communal assimilation (Scott 1967). In this
documentation of goal displacement, external demands of the economy gave rise to changes
in the organization’s belief system.
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Another example of where a business orientation overrode an organization’s original
goals was the qualitative study of a community revitalization project in Racine, Wisconsin
(Alexander 1976). Harboring conflicting priorities from the onset, a coalition of community
and business leaders, concerned with the devastating effects their community’s social and
physical deterioration, formed to oversee the development of a revitalization project that,
incidentally, was financially backed by a large multinational corporation that had a vested
interested in the area. Due to the organization’s rapid growth and the advancement of vested
interests among the more business-oriented senior staff, a division of labor and
specialization quickly developed. Emphasis on the economic viability of the association
ultimately supplanted the original revitalization objectives. This study is explicitly
suggestive of Thompson and McEwen’s (1958) implication of goal setting as a function of
competition for resources. Alexander (1976) stated that the availability of resources for
organizational use became the determinant factor of the decision-making processes.
Bohte and Meier (2000) defined goal displacement as Texas school districts’ proclivity to
misrepresent student pass rates on standardized exams. Because underperforming districts
become the target of public and school board scrutiny, it was hypothesized that less
advantaged districts would grant more student exemptions in order to bolster their
performances. A higher degree of racial heterogeneity and lack of resources were found to
be significantly associated with higher levels of goal displacement, as measured by
exemption rates.
As the previous research illustrates, goal displacement can result when the management
of goal-oriented processes are exploited whereby the manipulation of intended operations
takes precedence over the controlling of results. However, as goals related to the
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amelioration of complex social problems are themselves especially difficult to evaluate
quantitatively, the measurement of goal displacement is extremely obscure. As the literature
on goal displacement demonstrates, the identification and definition of goal displacement is
very subjective, and because of this, more easily studied qualitatively than quantitatively.
Goal displacement is defined in a variety of ways and can be attributed to a convergence
of internal and external factors. Internally, structural factors of a top-down imposed change
in operating procedures or ideologies, flawed foresight in the planning and implementation
of a program, excessive demands placed upon staff, multiple goals, and scarcity of resources
can lead to displacement. Externally, economic factors such as competition for resources
can force an organization to overlook its official goals and turn to operative goals that
facilitate operational viability. It may be concluded that goal displacement takes place
under a variety of conditions and within a multitude of environments. From this it may be
asked, could a bureaucratic organization such as the state experience goal displacement
within one or more of its agencies, and if so, what specific elements may give rise to
displacement? But before the question is delved into further, internal and external factors
that have been found to shape bureaucratic output and perhaps even to influence goal
displacement must be reviewed. It will be followed by research that examines factors that
directly impact the delivery of substance abuse treatment. It is the collection of these
following studies that will provide the framework from which the research design will be
constructed.
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Influencers of Bureaucratic Output
Findings Derived from Public Policy Administration Research
A wide range of variables has been used to assess the impact internal and external
environmental demands have upon bureaucratic output. In particular, this section considers
those that infer the external demand for public services and the corresponding internal
demands that are placed upon a bureaucracy in providing them. Because demand for and
supply of public services shape bureaucratic output, variables that measure level of services
(supply) and need (demand) for public program services were utilized in research that
examined variations in states’ administration of public policy and publicly funded programs.
However, because demand for services can be driven by supply, supply can be a function of
demand. A greater supply of public services may exist because need is greater in a
particular service area, but supplying that need, in turn, puts greater demands upon the
providing agency. Therefore, demand has not only been characterized by external factors
that impact public demand for services but also as an endogenous measure that affects the
level of burden placed upon the bureaucracy.
Demographic characteristics have frequently been modeled as influencers of demand of
public services. Socioeconomic indicators such as household wealth and health-related
statistics have the capacity to capture a state’s environmental condition so as to infer level of
demand for a particular public service. Schneider and Jacoby (1996) discovered a positive
relationship between per capita income and a state’s inclination to adopt optional Medicaid
services. A positive correlation between per capita income and Medicaid spending levels
was found by Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991). Barrilleaux and Miller (1988)
discovered supply of Medicaid services to be affected by per capita income. Dawson and
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Robinson (1963) found that per capita income influenced states’ adoption of public policies,
and the work of Keiser (1999) revealed median household income to affect the granting of
social security disability entitlements. Similar to per capita income, poverty and infant
mortality rates have also been utilized as variables to indicate a state’s overall health and
wellbeing, as well as state “conscience” indicators (Schneider 1988; Schneider and Jacoby
1996). These demographic characteristics can be considered external environmental
variables.
Keiser (1999) and Keiser and Soss (1998) also employed the term “task environment”
to describe an external level of demand placed upon a bureaucracy, or need for services.
However, task environment is a construct also commonly found in public administration
research to infer internally generated levels of demands placed upon agency workers.
Numbers of persons receiving services are frequently used as barometers to assess
internal task environment. Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) incorporated program
recipients as an index component to measure states’ economic environments. A state’s level
of child support enforcement was found to be a function of client need as measured by
number of clients receiving support (Keiser and Meier 1996). In another study, rather than
directly utilizing number of social welfare recipients, Keiser (1999) used the rate of change
in its caseloads for selected years. In their research on states’ Medicaid policy decisions,
Barrilleaux and Miller (1988) modeled supply of services to be a function of demand, where
supply, in part, was comprised of Medicaid recipients. A significant and positive correlation
between recipient population and Medicaid program expenditures was also found by
Schneider (1988).
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Agency expenditures are often employed as a measurement of bureaucratic resources
(supply), and hence internal stress. It is presumed that the greater the expenditures, the more
economically advantaged an agency is believed to be, and the better it is in providing
services. Whereas Schneider (1998), Schneider and Jacoby (1996), and Buchanan,
Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) used agency expenditures as a measurement of output,
Keiser and Soss (1998), in their examination of discretionary patterns in the granting of
child support program exemptions, and Meier and Keiser’s (1996) research on variations in
states’ enforcement of child support, used spending as an indicator of a state’s level of
bureaucratic resources (supply). In both studies, agency expenditures were found to be a
function of bureaucratic effort and, hence agency output. Bohte and Meier (2000)
operationalized school district resources as student-teacher ratios and the per pupil
instruction funding. Modeling supply as a function of demand, Barrilleaux and Miller
(1988) discovered that less wealthy states with poor health services spent higher proportions
of personal income on Medicaid, and that states most in need were least able to provide
public care.
Closely tied to agency expenditures is a state government’s economic capacity to provide
services. A state with inadequate financial resources would find it difficult to fund its social
services programs. Keiser (1999), defining this environmental characteristic as “task
environment,” used the ratio of total state revenue less total state spending to indicate the
level of demand placed upon a bureaucracy.
Although not defined as such, Schneider’s (1988) and Schneider and Jacoby’s (1996) use
of level of government (state versus local) responsible for the administration of the Medicaid
program may be considered an internal task environment variable. In both studies, the use
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of the variable was selected because it was postulated that a more centralized bureaucracy is
a more efficient bureaucracy. Medicaid is a federal program, yet the states are granted
substantial flexibility in its implementation. It is “a difficult program to administer because
it requires balancing federal directives with state specific concerns” (1988:758). Some
states have chosen to administer it at the local level rather than at the state level. Local
implementation adds an additional layer of bureaucracy that further snarls program
implementation and delivery and augments program expenses (Schneider1988; Schneider
and Jacoby 1996). For this reason, factors that increase a bureaucracy’s size can be
considered to be a structural task demand element.
The more arduous the internal and external task environment, the more difficult it is for
workers to carry out the stated goals of an organization. Task environment was documented
as having contributed to goal displacement in Aviram’s (2000) Israeli boarding school
research and Bohte and Meier’s (2000) study on Texas school districts’ inclination to
misrepresent standardized exam scores. As Aviram’s (2000) study was qualitative, the
researcher subjectively observed the task environment to be overwhelming for the boarding
school employees. In contrast, Bohte and Meier’s (2000) task environment was
quantitatively defined. An overwhelming task demand was defined as the racial
homogeneity of a district’s population, operationalized as percentages of African American,
Latino, and low income students.
As the brief review of public administration literature illustrates, demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics of a population have been found to impact bureaucratic output
and thus be utilized to characterize an organization’s external task environment. Additional
considerations of bureaucratic traits to characterize internal task environment offer more
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illustrative power in explaining bureaucratic output. And although the reviewed literature
established a link between expenditures as bureaucratic resources and quantitatively-defined
agency output (efficiency), whether or not the agency is meeting the needs of its clientele
(effectiveness) remains uncertain. Aside from external demographic characteristics that
infer task environment in public policy research, the addition of structural task demand
components provides a more thorough open systems framework in which to analyze the
administration of public programs. The following sections will investigate influencing
factors specific to the delivery of substance abuse treatment: facility ownership and
performance characteristics and the effects of managed care.

Ownership and Performance of Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
As the subtitle implies, this collection of studies examined the impact of treatment
facility ownership on organizational performance. From this section, thesis research
variables specific to facility ownership and the subsequent differences in availability of
treatment and funding were constructed: ownership status, numbers clients treated, public
funding, type of treatment offered, and the availability of treatment at no charge.
It is often believed that an organization based upon a competitive market model of
operation, e.g. a profit motive with a strictly financial bottom line, is somewhat immune to
the goal displacement that is frequently argued to occur within government bureaucracy.
Whether or not this premise holds true for public substance abuse treatment facilities
remains unanswered, but here it will be assumed as such. Regardless, the following
summary of prior research illustrates that significant differences do exist between public,
non-profit, and for-profit treatment facilities, typically in regard to service and clientele
characteristics, access, funding, and financial performance. The greater part of the data
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utilized for this type of research were collected from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, typically from National Drug Abuse Treatment System Survey
(NDATSS), the National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (NTIES), or the
National Drug and Alcohol Treatment Unit Survey (NDATUS). Other sources of data were
derived from the combined research efforts of non-profit organizations and universities.
Several of the studies examined solely outpatient facilities (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno
1992; Wheeler and Nahra 2000; Friedmann, Alexander; and D’Aunno 1998), while others
looked at both inpatient and outpatient (Rodgers and Barnett 2000; Heinrich and Fournier
2004; Heinrich and Fournier 2005; Roman, Ducharme, and Knudson 2006).
The most substantial finding from this genre of literature is the presence of market
segmentation. For-profits appear to cater to less disadvantaged clientele who are more able
to pay out-of-pocket or who have private insurance (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992;
Wheeler and Nahra 2000; Friedmann, Alexander; and D’Aunno 1998; Rodgers and Barnett
2000; Roman, Ducharme, and Knudson 2006), a practice typically referred to as
“creaming.” For-profits treat a greater proportion of cocaine and heroin abusers and fewer
multiple-drug abusers than do public and non-profits, thus implying that those facilities may
market to more specialty drug type users that are privately insured and are financially
equipped to pay for out-of-pocket expenses (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992; Wheeler
and Nahra 2000; Rodgers and Barnett 2000). Wheeler and Nahra (2000) found that thirtyone percent of public facilities’ clientele were unable to pay, whereas five percent in forprofits were unable to do so. The literature review of Rodgers and Barnett (2000) indicated
that a greater proportion of for-profits also served the employed (Gerstein and Harwood
1990: Burke and Rafferty 1990), suburbanites (Yahr 1988), and those who were more likely
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to have successfully completed the treatment process (Gerstein and Harwood 1990).
Roman, Ducharme, and Knudsen (2006) discovered that clients of publicly funded facilities
were more likely to be on parole or probation and to have been referred from social services
agencies or the legal system.
For-profits were more likely to employ specialty staff to treat cocaine abusers and more
PhD staff. Public facilities were found to be the least specialized. For-profits programs
were smaller (Rodgers and Barnett; Roman, Ducharme, and Knudsen 2006) and offered less
individualized care than non-profits and public units (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992)
but exhibited significantly more admissions (Roman, Ducharme, and Knudsen 2006).
Dayhoff, Pope, and Huber (1994) reported that publicly funded facilities treated
substantially more clients and offered more outpatient treatment than privately funded units,
and that utilization rates for publicly funded exceeded those of privately funded.
Substantial differences in access to treatment were found between public and for-profit
facilities. Although public facilities had a longer wait list for admission, in effect no clients
were turned away, whereas for-profits rejected seven percent of potential clients. For-profits
were also less likely to allow reduced payment arrangements (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno
1992; Wheeler and Nahra 2000). Perhaps reflective of for-profits’ propensity for
specialization, Friedmann, Alexander, and D’Aunno (1998) found that public outpatient
facilities demonstrated a propensity for better access to ancillary services than for-profits.
The increased capacity of for-profit clients to pay and the inability of public clients are
evidenced by the differences in funding sources between publics and for-profits. Public
facilities are primarily financed by public (government) revenue sources, and, conversely,
private funding comprises the majority of funding for for-profits with approximately half of
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that derived from private insurance (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992; Wheeler and
Nahra 2000). Rodgers and Barnett (2000) found that public facilities were more than twice
as likely to receive Medicaid funding as for-profits, but for-profits that received Medicaid
collected substantially more Medicaid funding than publics wherein it was suggested that
certain for-profit facilities may market specifically to Medicaid recipients.
As an investor-owned business based upon a competitive market model of operation, forprofit facilities exact a level of financial performance not usually consigned to public
agencies. The research of Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno (1992) and Wheeler and Nahra
(2000) reinforced this private firm initiative of profit maximization. Both studies
demonstrated that for-profits charged substantially higher prices and realized higher profit
margins than public units. Public facilities tended to break even and had higher costs per
therapy hour. Non-profits fell between the two extremes for both costs per therapy hour and
profit margins. The research of Clark, Dorwart, and Epstein (1994) also revealed that public
units provided a significantly greater percentage of treatment at rates below cost and
collected fewer client fees. Among private units, the additional profit-maximizing practices
of providing financial incentives to employees, increased efforts to collect fees and
employing the use of collection agencies, emphasized billable services, reduced
administrative costs, charged fees for missed appointments, and required pre-payment were
revealed (Clark, Dowart, and Epstein 1994).
As evidenced by the research, observable differences do exist between for-profit and
public facilities. For-profits tend to treat and cater to a more affluent, privately-insured type
of clientele with specific addiction problems who are able to pay out-of-pocket costs if
necessary, whereas public units tend to treat less advantaged populations. Where public
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units demonstrated an “open door” policy on admissions, for-profits are more likely to
restrict service access, perhaps due to the presence of market forces (that public agencies
generally do not experience) and the emphasis on financial performance. Operating as a
business enterprise, for-profit facilities receive a greater proportion of their funding from
private sources, exhibit less concern for facilitating access to services, and glean higher
profits through inflated prices. However, financial performance is not necessarily indicative
of service quality or effectiveness. Heinrich and Fournier (2004; 2005), in search of
establishing a relationship between facility ownership and outcome, found that non-profits
were more effective than public and for-profit units in reducing the number of drugs patients
used after having had completed treatment (Heinrich and Fournier 2004). In both studies,
for-profits and non-profits were positively associated with patients continuing or beginning
full-time employment. Independent of facility ownership, treatment durations of thirteen or
more weeks were positively associated with abstinence and reduced drug usage (Heinrich
and Fournier 2005), a finding that has tremendous implications when viewed within the
context of the expanding market of managed care that will be addressed in the next section.

Managed Care
The effectiveness of substance abuse and mental health managed care, having evolved
as states contract with outside agencies to administer their Medicare and Medicaid
programs, has become an important issue in the study of treatment evaluation. Constructed
from the following works of research on managed care, the variables utilized in the thesis
research are HMO penetration rates, proportion of a state’s population without health
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insurance, the distribution of facilities with managed care contracts, and the type of parity
law a state has enacted.
As a form of privatization, managed care is a coordinated health care delivery system in
which a health maintenance provider acts as a liaison between patient and physician.
Having emerged as a contender on the health care scene in the 1980s, proponents have
touted it as efficient and cost-effective. Skeptics have questioned the resulting quality of
health care it produces. Health Maintenance Providers (HMOs), Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs), and Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) are the most familiar
types of Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). According to the website of a managed care
resource company, www.mcol.com, managed care is characterized by the management of
medical care provided, a contractual affiliation and organization of care providers, and
adherence to managed care rules. Group members are restricted to seeking care through the
prescribed network of care providers. From 1985 to 1999, the national total of persons
enrolled in an HMO rose from 19.1 million to a peak of 83.3 million. The rate fell to 77.7
million in 2006 but has since exhibited a steady increase. PPO enrollment has increased
nearly three-fold from 38.1 million in 1990 to 109 million in 2006 (MCOL).
Accompanying the increase in managed care enrollment is the discerning transformation
of HMOs from that of not-for-profit to that of for-profit. Due to non-profit health care
organizations adopting for-profit status, the purchase of non-profit associations by for-profit
companies, and overall industry growth, the total share of all HMO participation in for-profit
health plans has expanded to over 75 percent in many regions of the U.S. (Shen and Melnick
2004).
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Chi and Jasper (1998) reported there would be acceleration in the privatization of health
and mental health services. As of 2002, only a handful of states (Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania) have privatized their
substance abuse treatment services (Chi, Arnold, and Perkins 2003). Managed care has
shown to be an effective approach for controlling rapidly rising health care costs within the
realm of physical health but due to the chronic nature of addiction and the recurrent
treatment patterns of addicts, the effects of managed care on the delivery of mental health
and substance abuse care are not totally clear (Madonna 2000). However, several studies
have illustrated that substance abuse managed is not only an effective cost containment tool
but also resulted in greater patient access and utilization.
McCarty, Dilonardo, and Argeriou (2003) summarized findings of the managed
substance abuse care initiatives of four states - Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, and Nebraskarevealing it as an effective mode of treatment delivery and administration management
which organizations can utilize to their benefit. Rises in Medicaid mental health and
substance abuse expenditures in Nebraska and Iowa were curbed, and although the use of
inpatient services decreased, the utilization of outpatient and residential services grew. The
variations in the manner in which states administer their Medicaid programs and in states’
urbanization patterns made it difficult to make inferences between the four states or to
generalize findings to other states. Similar findings were reported by McCarty and
Argerious (2003) in their research specific to Iowa managed care.
Ettner, Argeriou, McCarty, Dilonardo, and Liu (2003) cited the findings of Galanter et al.
(2000), and Stein and et al. (1999) where reductions in the utilization of inpatient services
and increases in residential and outpatient services were reported, as well as those of Deck
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and et al. (2000) and Sturm (2000), which indicated that managed care does not impede and
may even boost access and utilization of treatment. No reductions in utilization and
decreased expenditures were revealed in a Massachusetts managed mental health and
substance abuse care study among Medicaid patients. A managed mental health and
substance abuse care study for Massachusetts’ Medicaid patients revealed decreased
expenditures and no reduction in utilization in the first year after its introduction (Callahan
and et al., 1995).
Ettner, Argeriou, McCarty, Dilonardo, and Liu (2003) investigated the effects of Iowa’s
introduction of managed care on uninsureds’ use of substance abuse services and reported
that after the introduction of managed substance abuse care, uninsured patients exhibited
increased illness severity. It was unknown if this had been due in part to uninsureds’
reduced access to care where only the most ill were able to enter treatment or to the change
in eligibility requirements for those that received publicly funded non-Medicaid services. In
contrast, improved effectiveness as measured by increased abstinence and reductions in
substance use were associated with the contracting out of treatment in Maine (Commons,
McGuire, and Riordan 1997).
Rosenburg (1996) investigated the relationship between HMO penetration and
expenditures and utilization of mental health and substance abuse services in general
hospitals and discovered higher rates of outpatient utilization in high HMO penetration areas
and lower utilization in lower HMO penetration areas. Expenditures for inpatient and
outpatient mental health services in low HMO areas increased more rapidly than in high
HMO areas.
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The abovementioned research indicates that the managed care of substance abuse
services are an effective cost containment strategy that appear to stimulate greater
utilization. Cost effectiveness was undoubtedly enhanced by reductions in the costly use of
inpatient services. Although reductions in inpatient treatment and increases in the use rates
of residential and outpatient services were consistently reported, no definite conclusions can
be made as to how these changes impact rates of dependence and abuse or gaps between the
need and receipt of treatment. Contrary to the positive findings on substance abuse managed
care research, studies of program-level treatment outcomes revealed a positive relationship
between treatment duration and improved clinical outcomes (Heinrich and Fournier 2004;
2005). None of the studies addressed the relationship between the reduction in inpatient
treatment and treatment duration, but it may be surmised that for cost cutting purposes, with
managed care comes reduced treatment episodes.
Summarizing, two distinct trends are emerging in field of substance abuse treatment.
First is increasing market segmentation. The rich who can afford the out-of-pocket
treatment expenses and carry private insurance are more likely to be treated at specialized
for-profit facilities, while public treatment centers are left to serve those who cannot pay for
care and who are without insurance. Second, the spread of managed care has altered patient
care. Outpatient treatment is replacing inpatient and has likely shortened the duration of
treatment even though longer treatment episodes produce more effective patient outcomes.
Managed care provides greater access and utilization, but inpatient treatment that is assumed
to be essential to recovery is being supplanted by increased, but perhaps less effective,
outpatient services.
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These two trends not only reflect the far-reaching effects of managed care but may also
shed light on the phenomenon of goal displacement as it is hypothesized to occur in public
bureaucracies. Following this underlying theory, the variation between private and public
facilities can be explained by the different levels of goal displacement each facility type
experiences. Private facilities operate under a competitive market model in an environment
where market forces breed organizational fitness. Ultimately, less effective and efficient
private firms do not survive and are replaced by more robust firms that best optimize their
resources, a characteristic not generally attributed to public bureaucracies. A competitive
edge is not a priority for a state-run treatment facility as it is for a for-profit operator because
public units are not forced to hone their competitive abilities. Absent of a profit motive, the
“transitive goal” of a public treatment unit is to serve the public, but with it comes the
“reflexive goal” (Mohr 1973) of preserving itself; and for the most part, evaluating the “net
output” of either a public or private facility is complex at best. The glaring fact that public
facilities are bearing an increasingly greater burden for treating those unable to pay for
private treatment may increase the likelihood for goal displacement to occur within the
public sector.
The foregoing literature review, albeit protracted but nevertheless essential, demonstrated
how external environmental and internal structural factors can influence bureaucratic output,
which then can lead to goal displacement. The excessive demands of a state’s task
environment, taking the form of servicing a largely disproportionate disadvantaged
population, inadequate state financial resources, and structural burdens can be attributed to a
state’s level of goal displacement. Therefore, these same conditions can also affect a state’s
delivery of substance abuse treatment, but in order to assess goal displacement, aggregate
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state-level treatment facility characteristics must be taken into consideration, as well as the
affects of managed care on treatment delivery.
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Chapter 3: Research Design
Research Hypotheses and Measures - Operational Variables
In the preceding section, goal displacement as a conceptual variable and factors that
influence bureaucratic output and those that impact the delivery of substance abuse
treatment were discussed. It is this previous discussion that provides the blueprint from
which thesis research will be designed. In following sections, goal displacement as the
dependent variable and the independent variables that will be hypothesized to be the
probable causes of the phenomenon are operationalized and quantified. Additional
intervening variables associated with facility characteristics and managed care that are
hypothesized to affect the delivery of substance abuse treatment as also identified and
quantified.

The Dependent Variables
For the purposes of this research, numerical indices, assigned as “PerfALC” and
“PerfDRG” to designate states’ substance abuse treatment delivery performances, will be
used to reflect the level of goal displacement a state experiences as measured by several
independent variables. These performance indices are based upon yearly data published the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) “State Estimates of Substance Use from the National
Surveys on Drug Use and Health.” The data include state-level statistics on substance use
and treatment.
Percentage of persons aged twelve years and older reporting past year illicit drug
dependence and abuse and percentage of persons aged twelve years and older reporting
needing but not receiving treatment for illicit drug use in the past year were used to calculate
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state’s drug treatment delivery performance. A performance measure for each state’s
delivery of drug treatment was calculated beginning with the first year for which the needing
but not receiving drug treatment data was available, 2001, and for years 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, and 2006. These variables were designated as “PerfDRG” for each of the given years.
A similar performance measure was also calculated for states’ delivery of alcohol
treatment using each state’s percentages of persons aged twelve years and older reporting
past year alcohol dependence and abuse and percentages of persons aged twelve years and
older reporting needing but not receiving treatment for alcohol use in the past year. A
performance measure for each state’s delivery of alcohol treatment was calculated for the
years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. A performance measure for 2001 was not
calculated because the needing but not receiving alcohol treatment data were not available
until 2002. These performance variables were designated as “PerfALC” for each of the
given years. As previously discussed, the value of these variables, which indicate level of
performance, should reflect a state’s level of goal displacement.
State percentages of persons needing but not receiving treatment (also referred to as
treatment gap) for alcohol and illicit drugs were originally planned as indicators of goal
displacement, but further examination revealed that when viewed in relationship to each
states’ corresponding dependence rates, treatment gap was not indicative of performance.
For illicit drugs, a state’s drug treatment gap was highly correlated to its rate of drug
dependence as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1 - Pearson Correlation of drug treatment
gaps and drug dependence rates
Pearson
Correlation
GAPDrg 2003 to
.879
DEPDrg 2003
GAPDrg 2004 to
.895
DEPDrg 2004
GAPDrg 2005 to
.916
DEPDrg 2005
*all significant at .01 level

As demonstrated by the bivariate correlations between the two variables, high rates of
dependence typically begot high treatment gaps. It was deduced that states with high rates
of dependence would tend to have overburdened delivery systems and thus exhibit difficulty
in meeting the needs of their addicted populations. However, this premise did not always
hold true. For example, in 2002 Connecticut ranked fourth as having the smallest alcohol
treatment gap but ranked seventh worst on alcohol dependence. From this it may be inferred
that the state was relatively effective in meeting the needs of its alcohol addicted
populations. Therefore, a separate measurement for both drug and alcohol that would reflect
a state’s treatment gap in relation to its dependence rates was calculated. These performance
measures for each state, for each year were calculated with the following formula:

p = (estimated1 treatment gap – treatment gap mean) – (observed dependence rate – dependence rate
mean)

One additional step was taken to incorporate each state’s yearly performance
measurement into four separate variables. Suggestive of Seashore and Yuchtman’s (1967)
1

All calculated performance measures take into account published estimates from SAMHSA’s “State
Estimates of Substance Use from the National Surveys on Drug Use and Health.”
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“net output” variable that is a better indicator if measured longitudinally over a long period
of time, the mean for the 2001-2006 drug performances was calculated, designated as the
variable “OvAllDRG,” and used to indicate a state’s overall capacity in meeting the needs of
its drug addicted population. Following Thompson and McEwen’s (1958) position that
volatility impedes the goal redefining and reinterpretation processes that are critical to goal
attainment, the standard deviation of “OVAllDRG,” designated as the variable
“ConsistDRG,” was used to indicate the consistency of a state’s drug treatment delivery
performance. Likewise similar computations were performed to assess a state’s overall
performance (“OvAllALC”) and consistency (“ConsistALC”) of its delivery of alcohol
treatment.2 As complete data to compute the yearly performance measurements were not
available until 2002, the variables for alcohol treatment were calculated using five years of
data (2002-2006) rather than the six that were used for drug treatment.
In summary, a state’s level of goal displacement is determined by its overall capacity and
consistency in meeting the needs of its drug and alcohol abusing population as demonstrated
by the variables “OvAllDRG,” “ConsistDRG,” “OvAllALC,” and “ConsistALC.” A state
that exhibits a high overall performance measurement with a low variability measurement
will be better in meeting the needs of its addicted populations through providing stable and
effective treatment. It is inferred that such a state experiences minimal goal displacement.
Similarly, the lower and more volatile a state’s overall performance measurement, the more
handicapped it is in delivering treatment. It is inferred that such a state experiences
elevated levels of goal displacement. The reader must keep in mind that states may be
consistent in bad performance as well as exhibiting good performance but with a high level
2

See Appendix B for a listing of variables and their corresponding formulas that were used in the
transformation of new variables from existing sources. Throughout Chapter 3, footnotes will be provided to
indicate the transformed variables.
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of volatility. Additionally, states may fare well in treating drug abuse and dependence but
fail in the area of alcohol or vice versa.
The specific factors that are chosen as independent variables that will be hypothesized to
influence a state’s level of goal displacement in its delivery of substance abuse treatment are
discussed in the following section.

The Independent Variables
The hypotheses that are to be presented in the subsequent sections are based upon two
assumptions: 1) public bureaucracies are more prone to goal displacement than private
organizations; therefore, public substance abuse treatment facilities are less effective in
meeting the needs of addicted populations and 2) because of the threat of competition and
stakeholder accountability, for-profit facilities are more efficient and provide more effective
care.

The Effects of Task Environment on Goal Displacement
Referring to Keiser’s (1999) use of the concept “task environment,” the degree to which
demands are placed upon a bureaucracy may directly influence a state’s level of goal
displacement. In this section, the internal task environment variables of treatment gaps,
state finances, block grant funding, and bureaucratic size are identified, and the hypotheses
regarding their relationships to a state’s level of goal displacement are formed. In the
following section, the external task environment variables comprising state environment are
discussed in a similar manner.
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The state’s internal task environment.
In the case of substance abuse delivery, the proportion of a state’s population that is in
need of, but not in receipt of alcohol and drug treatment can be defined as a demand that is
placed upon a state. It is reflective of a state’s deficiency in reaching those who are in need
of treatment, and it is those states with higher treatment gaps that face greater pressures to
meet the needs of their addicted populations. This critical and costly social problem of
addiction may cause some states to respond impetuously, acting more in the name of
“politics” rather than making policy decisions based upon scientific research, without having
the full knowledge or understanding of how a state’s environmental characteristics impact
the delivery of treatment. Based on this reasoning, it is hypothesized that a state with a
higher percentage of population in need of but not in receipt of both alcohol (GAPAlc) and
drug (GAPDrg) treatment will exhibit higher levels of goal displacement.
A state with inadequate financial resources would find it difficult to fund substance
abuse treatment and prevention programs. For this reason, and following Keiser’s (1999)
use of a state’s ratio of total state revenue to total state spending, a similar variable will also
be used as an indicator of level of demand placed upon a bureaucracy. Budget restraints in
the form of scarce financial resources can greatly impede an organization’s courses of action
and as Simon (1964) theorized, courses of action are a function of an organization’s
constraints whereby the inequalities amongst them are minimized for any desired outcome.
The goal of providing effective substance abuse treatment could be supplanted by other state
crises or conditions that necessitate other courses of action. In addition, a wealthier state is
likely to be better equipped to bear the financial and attitudinal pressures for transferring
critical treatment research to practice rather than to rely on “the usual way of doing things”
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for fear of uncertainty (Simpson 2002; Rosenheck 2001). A recent Robert Wood Johnson
study on ways states can improve prevention and treatment also reported the necessity of
financial resources (Rosenbloom and et al. 2006). The more financially endowed a state, the
better able it should be to circumvent the ill effects of goal displacement. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that the higher a state’s ratio of revenues to expenditures (REV/EXP)3, the
lower its level of goal displacement.
The more money an organization allocates to solving a specific problem, the less of a
problem it should become. As the federal government provides grant monies to all states to
fund their substance abuse programs, a state’s level of federal funding will act as an
expenditures variable. Per capita state Block Grant funding for prevention (BGPrv) and per
capita Block Grant funding for treatment (BGTrtmt) will be used as proxies for earmarked
funding resources. Based on the rationale that federal funding helps states prevent and treat
substance abuse, it is hypothesized that positive relationships exist between both Block
Grant funding variables and performance. Therefore, lower levels of goal displacement
should be found among states that have higher levels of Block Grant funding.
Schneider (1988) and Schneider and Jacoby (1996) discovered that factors that increase a
bureaucracy’s size can burden administrative processes, which then could lead to goal
displacement. By the same token, excess government personnel should increase costs and
create additional burdens for all administration processes. That a bureaucracy’s size can be
considered as a hindrance to effective administration, per capita state government
administration (GOVAdm)4, per capita full-time equivalent state government employment

3
4

Transformed variable
Transformed variable
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(FTEEmpl)5, and per capita state government payroll (GOVPyr)6 will be utilized to assess a
state government’s level of bureaucratization. Based on the theory of goal displacement,
the lower a state’s level of bureaucratization, as measured by the aforementioned variables,
the better its performance score, and hence, the less likely it experiences goal displacement.
In summary, larger alcohol and drug treatment gaps and greater levels of government
administration, employment, and payroll should associated with greater levels of goal
displacement. Lower levels of goal displacement should be found among states that have a
higher ratio of revenues to expenditures and that also have higher levels of Block Grant
funding. Next, additional environmental factors variables that are believed to affect goal
displacement will be operationalized and their empirical measures identified.

The state’s external task environment.
As evidenced by the research on public policy administration, socioeconomic variables
can be used as proxies to infer a state’s environmental condition, or external task
environment. Such factors have been found to shape bureaucratic output. The external task
environment variables of median household income, infant mortality rate, percentage of
population without insurance and receiving public aid, and percentage of population of
American Indian/Alaska Native heritage are identified and their relationships to goal
displacement are discussed.
Personal wealth and infant mortality were found to impact public policy (Schneider 1988;
Schneider and Jacoby 1996; Buchanan, Capperlleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991; Barrilleaux and
Miller 1988; Dawson and Robinson 1963; Keiser 1999). As an indicator of state wealth,

5
6

Transformed variable
Transformed variable
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median household income (MHHInc) will be used rather than per capita income because the
statistic takes into account the extreme high and low income values that per capita income
does not. (For a complete listing of variables and their sources, see Appendix C). Infant
mortality rate (IMR), percentage of population without insurance coverage (W/OIns), and
percentage of population that receives public aid (PubAid) will be used as indicators to gage
a state’s level of well-being. The healthier and wealthier a state’s population, the better and
more consistent its treatment performance. Health and wealth typically imply success, and
thus a desired standard of living, a condition that each state should try to provide for its
citizens through wise policy decision-making.
In addition, wealthier populations are in positions that enable them to pay for better
health care, in this specific instance, to be treated in for-profit substance abuse facilities
where goal displacement is presumed to be minimal. The presence of these aforementioned
desirable environmental conditions should also reflect the ability of a state to exercise
positive control over goal displacement as it is hypothesized to occur in public
bureaucracies. Therefore, a negative relationship should be found between household
income and goal displacement, and positive associations should exist between greater infant
mortality rates, persons without insurance, and those receiving public aid to goal
displacement.
As one additional indicator of external task environment, states’ percentages American
Indian Alaska Native populations (AIAN) will be considered. Bohte and Meier (2000)
employed a school district’s racial composition as a measurement of task environment,
stating that more homogeneous populations were less difficult to educate. By the same
token, a more homogenous substance abusing population should be easier to treat than one
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more ethnically diverse. Therefore, as ethnic homogeneity should be conducive to low goal
displacement, a positive relationship should exist between percentage of native populations
to goal displacement. Due to the historically chronic nature of alcohol abuse among the
American Indian Alaska Natives (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Indian
Health Service (No Date); Pueschel 2006) this population was chosen as a variable.

Treatment Facility Characteristics
This section discusses the mitigating factors that influence the supply and delivery of
substance abuse treatment and, invariably, treatment effectiveness, but are not necessarily
viewed as direct but rather indirect links to a state’s level of goal displacement. In
particular, these variables represent aggregate state facility characteristics of ownership
status, type of treatment, admissions, public funding, and the availability of free treatment.
The first variable in this category is the state-level distribution of public (PUB), private
non-profit (PNP), and private for-profit (PFP) treatment facilities. As public facilities are
more prone to goal displacement, states that have proportionately greater distributions of
public facilities should experience poorer performances and hence increased goal
displacement. Likewise, states with greater distributions of private facilities should
experience better performance. As research on treatment facility ownership has found that
the performance of non-profits falls somewhere between that of publics and for-profits, no
hypothesis will be provided.
The type of treatment offered is also hypothesized to impact delivery performance.
Researchers typically examine either outpatient or inpatient care, but not the relationship
between the two. Studies indicated that the presence of managed care favors the use of
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outpatient over inpatient treatment because of cost savings, yet better patient outcomes are
achieved by greater lengths of treatment. Assuming that inpatient treatment is more
effective due to its intensity and longer treatment periods, minimal goal displacement will be
exhibited by those states that offer proportionately greater amounts of inpatient services over
outpatient care. The variable used here is a state’s ratio of the median number of inpatient to
outpatient clients (IP/OP)7. Because public units are less likely to offer inpatient treatment
(Roman, Ducharme, and Knudsen 2006), the higher a state’s inpatient to outpatient ratio, the
less likely the state will experience goal displacement as measured by overall performance.
The next variable considered is clients (CLIENTS) in treatment per 100,000. As public
facilities are primarily financed with public monies and private facilities with private monies
(Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992; Wheeler and Nahra 2000), and publicly funded units
treat substantially more clients than private units (Dayhoff, Pope, and Huber 1994), it is
hypothesized that a state with higher numbers of clients per 100,000 will exhibit more goal
displacement than a state that treats fewer clientele. Public facilities may treat greater
numbers of the addicted, but because public facilities are more prone to goal displacement,
state rates of substance abuse dependence remain relatively unaffected in states that treat
more clients.
Similar to the public funding findings referred to above, a variable for percentage of
facilities that receive public funding for treatment programs will be used (RecPubFd).
Again, because public facilities treat proportionately greater numbers of clients than forprofits, and because public facilities are more prone to goal displacement, it is hypothesized
that the higher a state’s percentage of facilities financed with public funding, the more likely
the state is to experience goal displacement.
7

Transformed variable
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In addition, states with a greater proportion of facilities that offer treatment at no charge
(NoChrg) for clients who cannot pay will experience greater levels of goal displacement
because a significant proportion of public clients are generally unable to pay (Wheeler and
Nahra 2000) and therefore, it may be inferred, are more likely to seek care at public units. It
is assumed that states that have proportionately greater numbers of facilities that treat free of
charge are also states that have more disadvantaged populations.

Managed Care
In this section, a discussion of the effect of managed care on state performance and the
selection of variables related to managed care are discussed. The variables chosen for this
section are also believed to mitigate a state’s treatment performance but are not viewed as
distinct links to goal displacement. Drawing inferences from the reviewed research that
suggests managed care enhances access to treatment, it is postulated that managed care does
reduce states’ gaps between need and receipt of treatment, but performance remains
relatively unaffected, and hence level of goal displacement, because although the treatment
gap is reduced, rates of dependence persist. The specific variables discussed here are state
parity laws, HMO penetration rates, and proportions of facilities with managed care
agreements/contracts.
The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 mandated that if a health care plan provided
mental health care coverage, it must do so at the same level of its physical care offerings
(Martin 2002). However, it is not obligatory for states to include substance abuse treatment
services. The level of parity integration is determined individually by each state. As of
2002, eight states had full parity laws for mental health and substance abuse, nineteen had

50

minimum mandated benefits but four allowed coverage only for alcohol abuse, and
seventeen had mandated benefits but seven states allowed only for alcoholism (Martin
2002)8. For this reason, Dummy variables were constructed to indicate if a state has full
parity (PARITY), minimum mandated benefits (MMBenf), or mandated offering (ManOff)
laws. As full parity assures the greatest level of mental health and substance abuse
treatment coverage, states with full parity should be better able to treat their addicted
populations, states with mandated offering the least, and those with minimum mandated
falling somewhere in between. But increased access to treatment, as the following
paragraphs will illustrate, does not necessarily imply a long-term reduction in rates of
dependence or abuse. Because of the complexities involved in state laws, it is difficult to
form concrete hypotheses pertaining to a goal displacement and a state’s type of parity law.
The relationship between the state HMO penetration rates and treatment access is a
frequent topic in substance abuse treatment. Research has demonstrated that managed care
results in the reduction of inpatient utilization (McCarty, Dilonardo, and Argeriou, 2003;
McCarty and Argeriou, 2003; Galanter et al., 2000; Stein and et al., 1999), and thus
shortened intensive treatment duration, yet better clinical outcomes were achieved with
extended treatment (Heinrich and Fournier, 2004;2005). However, the benefit of managed
care is that increases in residential9 and outpatient services were reported. Therefore, states
with higher penetrations of managed care, as indicated by the percentage of a state’s
population enrolled in HMOs (HMO), may exhibit a lower gap between need and receipt of

8

A full parity state is designated as having equal coverage between mental health services and physical care
services, minimum mandated as having mandated coverage for mental health services but at levels below full
parity benefits, and mandated offering as further reduced benefits. Definitions are defined by the Health Policy
Tracking Service at the National Conference of State Legislators. For additional information see
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/pmsap.pdf
9
The difference between “inpatient” and “residential” treatment is not specified.
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treatment than those states with lower penetration rates, but rates of dependence should
remain unaffected. Because of this, states with higher HMO penetration rates should exhibit
no appreciable success in treating their addicted populations as measured by overall
performance. In terms of goal displacement, increased HMO rates should result in greater
levels of goal displacement.
The final variable considered in this section is percentage of facilities with managed care
contracts (MCContr). Similar to the HMO penetration rate, the increased presence of
managed care does not necessarily imply effectiveness. Access to treatment may be
improved, but long-term reduction in substance use is unaffected because of cost
containment priorities. Therefore, a state’s percentage of facilities with managed care
agreements should not exhibit any appreciable effect on a state’s level of goal displacement
as measured by overall performance.
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Chapter 4 – Methods
In the preceding chapter, the factors hypothesized to impact states’ levels of goal
displacement with respect to the substance abuse treatment were conceptualized and then
operationalized. The following section will describe the statistical techniques that are used
to explain why goal displacement varies among the states. The unit of analysis is the state.
The sample includes the fifty U.S. states plus the District of Columbia for a total of fifty-one
observations. This thesis research uses cross-sectional data collected primarily from
government sources, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S.
Census Bureau. For a complete list of variables and their sources, see Appendix A. Two
sets of independent variables are utilized (see Appendices C and D for the detailed data
sets). The first set (T1) is used for the analyses described in the subsequent paragraphs. The
second set of data (T2), encompassing a later time period, is used in the final step of the
analyses and the procedure is described at the end of the Methods section. As the dependent
variables are constructed from data that cover the time period from which both the T1 and T2
data are collected, this final procedure will complement and elucidate the findings.
Descriptive statistics are performed to discern minimum, maximum, mean, and standard
deviation of the dependent and independent variables, thus demonstrating how each variable
varies separately from one another. This univariate analysis is accompanied by brief
descriptions of each state’s environmental condition, state wealth, substance abuse
resources, and government administration. States’ level of goal displacement will be
inferred by their typically good, poor, or average treatment delivery performances and their
range of consistencies.
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After examining each variable separately, bivariate correlations are calculated to observe
the relationships between variables two at a time and to inspect for multicollinearity, thus
providing information/insight on the extent to which the independent variables covary with
the dependent variables in the hypotheses and how strongly associated they are to one
another. Following the bivariate correlations, trends in the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables will be examined using Paired Sample T-Tests and
One-Way ANOVA. These two techniques examine trends in the relationships between the
independent and dependent variables and discern if the treatment delivery environment of a
state or region is stable or experiences fluctuation over time. The multivariate techniques of
factor analysis and regression will then be used to further unravel the relationship between a
state’s level of goal displacement and the delivery of its substance abuse treatment.
The state as the unit of analysis is advantageous for it is a naturally occurring,
independent unit. Similar to the administration of Medicaid, the federal government
provides states with funding yet the states are given the autonomy to administer treatment
and prevention programs as they see fit. Another advantage of using the state as a unit of
analysis is that comparable data for all states are available. On a regular basis, U.S
Government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the
Census Bureau, methodologically research and make readily available data pertaining to the
U.S. states. In an ideal world, the purported superiority (valid and reliable) of government
data should endow public bureaucrats with the essential framework from which federal and
state public policy decisions are made. As such, the results of the research should be
representative of not just the sample but to the population as a whole, therefore providing for
generalizability.
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One of the limitations of using the state as the unit of analysis is that the sample size is
small, merely fifty-one. A small sample may erroneously diminish the statistical
significance of the model (Allison 1999). That this research relies primarily on government
data is another caveat. The principal purpose of this research is to identify and substantiate
the presence of goal displacement that is theorized to take place within government
bureaucracies. That such a bureaucracy is responsible for the collection, investigation, and
publication of the data directly challenges the validity of the research.
Another limitation is that it may not be appropriate to use state-wide employment or
financial data to infer a single state agency’s internal task environment. As state
government is composed of many different agencies, with different budgets and under
different leadership, it may be erroneous to make the generalization from whole to part.
The following describes in detail how each statistical analysis is performed.

Paired Sample T-Tests
To distinguish if states’ yearly dependence rates, gaps, and performance means for any
two consecutive years differ significantly from one another, paired sample t-tests will be
conducted for the alcohol and drug categories. T-tests for paired years 2001 and 2002, 2002
and 2003, 2003 and 2004, 2004 and 2005, and 2005 and 2006 will be conducted for states’
yearly drug dependence rates, drug gaps, and drug performance to examine if significant
variations exist among the paired years. Likewise, paired sample t-tests for states’ yearly
alcohol dependence rates, alcohol gap rates, and alcohol performance for paired years 2002
and 2003, 2003 and 2004, 2004 and 2005, and 2005 and 2006 will be conducted to similar
purposes.
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One-Way ANOVA
To examine regional trends in performance and volatility, One-Way Analyses of
Variances will be performed. The states were categorized into the following eight regions:
1) New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont) 2) Mideast (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania) 3) Great Lakes (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) 4)
Plains (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota) 5)
Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia) 6) Southwest (Arizona,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) 7) Rocky Mountains (Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah,
and Wyoming) 8) Far West (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).
Least Significant Difference is used as a post hoc test to assess the extent of regional
differences.

Linear Regression
In the next step, multiple regression is used to characterize the influence of variables
upon one another whereby more accurate inferences about the relationship between goal
displacement and the independent variables can be made. Using the Enter Method, a
preliminary regression is performed regressing the dependent variables on the independent
variables in order to identify variables significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. A final
model is constructed using the resulting statistically significant independent variables.
From this model, explanatory statistics are drawn from the resulting Betas, for assessing the
relative strengths of relationships between variables, the multiple R, for measuring the
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strengths of relationships between the independent variables, and the overall F test.
Descriptive statistics are obtained from the R Squared and illustrate the proportion of
variance that is explained by the independent variables in the sample.
The reliability of the regression model is further tested with an additional step. A
comparable set of data encompassing a later time period (T2) is collected from identical
sources for additional multiple regression analyses, and a regression model is constructed.10
Comparisons between the two sets of results are examined and the conclusions will be
drawn about the similarities or differences in the models’ significance and in the explanatory
power of the variables. The thesis will conclude with a discussion summarizing the
findings, their implications, and the limitations of the study.

10

The targeted year for the T1 time period data is 2002 and 2005 for T2. However, exceptions to this were
made as data for certain variables for those two specific years were not available. An attempt was made to
maintain a three-year time period between the T1 and T2 data.
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Chapter 5 – Findings
Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variables
Descriptive statistics were calculated for the T1 twenty-one interval level independent
variables. In comparing the mean to the median, the SPSS output indicates that many of the
variables demonstrate approximately normal distributions with a partiality for slight positive
skewness, thus indicating a small preponderance of outlying values above the variable mean.
Skewness statistics above 2.00 are found for block grant expenditures for treatment (3.20),
AIAN population (3.06), government administration (2.71), and ratio of inpatient to
outpatient clients (2.02). No skewness statistics below -2.00 are discerned. The District of
Columbia is observed as a frequent outlier in many of the following descriptive statistics.
Grouping the variables into categories of internal and external task environment, supply
and delivery treatment characteristics, and managed care, the following several paragraphs
will summarize the descriptive findings. The results illustrate the extensive variability that
occurs in the independent variables among the U.S. states and District of Columbia.

Internal task environment.
As stated in the introduction of the thesis, the statistics regarding the national treatment
gaps for alcohol and drugs are startling. The variation among the states is no less surprising.
In 2002, the percentage of persons in need of but not in receipt of alcohol treatment range
from 5.64% in West Virginia to a staggering 9.58% in Nebraska. The mean is 7.52% with
standard deviation 1.09%. For states with large treatment gaps, Nebraska is followed by
Washington D.C. (9.55%), South Dakota (9.49%), North Dakota (9.48%), Colorado (9.03%)
and New Mexico (9.00%), and Arizona (8.79%), the majority of which have high
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percentages of American Indian/Alaska Native populations. Low alcohol treatment gap
states include Maine (5.87%), Maryland (6.01%), Connecticut (6.12%), New Jersey
(6.14%), Alabama (6.17%), and Kentucky (6.18%).
As the acceptability of alcohol use and its potential for abuse are culturally pervasive, the
range for persons in need of but not in receipt of treatment for illicit drug in 2002 is
substantially smaller than for gaps in alcohol treatment. Drug treatment gap rates vary from
a low of 2.17% in Wisconsin to high of 3.54% in New Mexico. The mean is 2.71% and the
standard deviation 0.32%. Other high drug treatment gap states for 2002 include Arizona
(3.41%), Washington and Washington, D.C., (both at 3.3%), Rhode Island (3.32%), Alaska
(3.12%), and Oregon (3.09%). However, the reader must be reminded that at that time, the
methamphetamine epidemic was gaining full force in the Upper Northwest (Suo 2004);
therefore, the statistics for Oregon and Washington should come as no surprise. Following
Wisconsin, states that exhibit the smallest drug treatment gaps are Hawaii (2.23%), Iowa
and Kansas (both at 2.32%), Minnesota and New Jersey (both at 2.33%), and Pennsylvania
(2.35%).
Per capita block grant expenditures for prevention vary from $0.84 in Arkansas to $1.74
in the District of Columbia, with a mean of $1.11 and a standard deviation of $0.19. For
treatment activities, per capita block grant funding fluctuates from $2.75 in North Carolina
to $8.77 in West Virginia, with a mean of $3.82 and a standard deviation of $3.82. As
demonstrated by these block grant statistics, states allocate significantly more funding to
treatment than to prevention activities.
State wealth, as measured by the ratio of total state revenues to total state expenditures, is
shown to have extreme outliers on both sides of the distribution. The District of Columbia,
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operating with a per capita deficit, exhibits a ratio of zero, while at the other end of the
spectrum, the ratio for the resource-rich state of Wyoming is calculated to be 2.25. The
mean for the distribution of fifty-one observations is 1.16 with a standard deviation of 0.242.
Two other states, Iowa (.9901) and South Carolina (.9833) demonstrate operational deficits.
Other low ratios are exhibited by Arizona (1.00), Indiana (1.0082), and Vermont (1.0225).
The most financially resourceful are Wisconsin (1.4067) and Oregon (1.3319). Although
the extreme ratios of both Wyoming and D.C. balance out the distribution, to exclude these
two cases from the analysis would provide a more realistic range of states’ financial
conditions.
Another internal task environment variable, per capita state government administration,
ranges from a low of $195 in both North Carolina and Texas to a high of $804 in Alaska.
The mean is calculated as $304 with a standard deviation of $103. Other thrifty
administrated states are Tennessee ($202), Alabama ($204), and Arkansas ($206). In
contrast, following Alaska in heavy administration costs per capita are the District of
Columbia ($559), Delaware ($480), and Oregon ($404).
As the District of Columbia has no state employees, the nation’s capital ranks last for
both per capita full-time equivalent government employees per 1,000 and per capita
government payroll per 1,000. Other than D.C., California, Florida, and Nevada share the
next lowest full-time equivalent government employees at 11 per capita, followed by
Arizona, Illinois, Ohio, and Texas, with 12 per capita. Following D.C, high levels per capita
government employment is exhibited by Hawaii (46), Alaska (39), Delaware (31), North
Dakota (26), and New Mexico (25). The mean for the 51 states is 17.82 and the standard
deviation 6.91.
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For least government payroll dollars per capita, following the District of Columbia’s
value of zero is Arizona ($37,394), Florida ($34,966), and Nevada ($39,928). Burgeoning
payroll dollars per capita are exhibited by Alaska, with a high of $149,610, followed by
Hawaii at $140,832 and Delaware at $105,480. All other state values are observed to be
under $80,000. The mean for this variable is $58,937 with a standard deviation of $23,055.
As the District of Columbia surfaces on several occasions as a positive or negative
outlier for the internal task variables, the federal unit is excluded from analysis and
descriptive statistics recalculated. Comparing the skewness statistics with and without the
District of Columbia reveals that when excluded, the skewness of the distributions for block
grant treatment, government administration FTE employment, and payroll are amplified.
From this it may be concluded that the District, relative to the other fifty states, it not the
sole outlier.

External task environment.
Household wealth, as measured by median household income is found to be the lowest in
West Virginia at $30,982 and highest in New Jersey at $58,759. The mean is $42,800 and
standard deviation $6,873. Another Mid-Atlantic state, New Hampshire, exhibits the lowest
infant mortality rate while the District of Columbia demonstrates the highest, at 10.89 with a
mean of 7.12 and a standard deviation of 1.55. Another close neighbor to New Jersey and
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, demonstrates the highest proportion of their population
having health insurance coverage (93.1%) while New Mexico being the least insured
(22.6%). The mean is calculated to be 13.37 with a standard deviation of 3.75. The
descriptive statistics for the variable public aid recipients, as another gauge of state wellbeing, show Wyoming residents as receiving the least aid in 2002 (1.4% of their population)
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and the District of Columbia the greatest, at 11.4%. The mean is 3.99 with a standard
deviation of 1.79.
Ethnically, AIAN as a percentage of a state’s population is found to be the lowest in
Pennsylvania (.010%) and the highest in Alaska at 15.6%. The mean is calculated to be
1.66% with a standard deviation of 2.96%. A kurtosis statistic of 10.22 indicates that of
states that do have AIAN populations, the proportions are extremely large.
It is noted that several of the Northeasterly states enjoy favorable environmental
conditions, high household wealth, low infant mortality, and high rates of insurance
coverage, and although perhaps premature to generalize, it may indicate that the many of the
states on the Eastern seaboard experience a comfortable standard of living.

Treatment facility characteristics.
The distributions of private non-profits range from a low of 21% in North Dakota to a
high of almost 87% in Iowa. Iowa also exhibits the lowest percentage of private for-profits
with just over four percent, and Colorado the highest at 51%. While West Virginia and
Rhode Island have extremely few or perhaps even no public treatment centers, Virginia has
just over 47%. Of all U.S. facilities surveyed by the SAMHSA Office of Applied Studies in
2002, almost 60% are private non-profits, 23% private for-profits, and nearly twelve percent
public.
On the low end for percentage of facilities that receive public funding for substance
abuse treatment programs is North Dakota, at just over 40% and on the other end, Montana,
at over 84%. The mean is nearly 69% with a standard deviation of 9.44. Minnesota has the
smallest proportion of facilities that treat at no charge (0.248) whereas West Virginia has the
largest, at 0.788. This suggests that West Virginia’s propensity for free treatment is due in
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part to the state’s having a significant number of low income households as median
household income is found to be the lowest in the nation.
Following Montana in largest percentage of facilities that receive public funding are
Alaska (83.9), Vermont (82.5), South Dakota (82.0), Arkansas (81.4), and West Virginia
(81.2). The states of Colorado (49.9), Illinois (53.3), Kansas (56.0), Kentucky (56.5), and
Maine (57.6) are among those whose treatment facilities receive the least amount of public
funding.
For number of clients treated in 2002, Washington D.C. treats the greatest number of
people per 100,000 (1149) and Arkansas the fewest at 176. The mean is 467 with a standard
deviation of 209. Other states that treat large numbers of clients include New York (897),
Colorado (869), Maryland (825), and Oregon (804). Texas (211), Minnesota (233),
Michigan (240), and Georgia (278) were among the states that treat the fewest per 100,000.
South Carolina demonstrates the lowest ratio of inpatient to outpatient clients (0.241) and
Hawaii the greatest (2.14), thus inferring that Hawaii is nearly nine times more likely to
utilize inpatient than outpatient treatment than South Carolina. The mean is calculated as
0.533 with a standard deviation of 0.40. North Dakota (1.933), Tennessee (1.59), Minnesota
(1.524), and Michigan (1.30) are among the states that demonstrate relatively high ratios of
inpatient to outpatient care while Rhode Island (0.296), North Carolina (0.30), Virginia
(0.328), and Maryland (0.338) relay more on outpatient.

Managed care.
According to the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, a private non-profit research organization
(www.statehealthfacts.org), managed care is not prevalent in Alaska. This is confirmed by
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the descriptive statistics for the two managed care variables. Of the 51 U.S. territories,
Alaska demonstrates the smallest percentage of its population enrolled in HMO’s. As of
July 2007, only fifty-six residents were members of the state’s sole HMO plan.
(www.statehealthfacts.org). Similarly, Alaska ranks lowest for percentage of facilities with
managed care contracts (13.8%). On the opposite end of the spectrum, California
demonstrates the highest percentage of its population enrolled in HMOs at 53.5%. The
mean for the variable is 23.17% and a standard deviation of 13.7%. Other states with HMO
penetration rates above thirty-eight percent include Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Colorado, and Oregon. Among the states with HMO rates below eight
percent are the Dakotas, Wyoming, Mississippi, Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, and Montana.
Oddly, for percentage of facilities with managed care agreements, Iowa ranks the highest,
with ninety-percent. This is an unusual observation because Iowa is the state with the
lowest HMO penetration rate. The fact that the data for HMO rates is for the year 2000 and
the data for managed care contracts is for 2002 may account for some of the difference as
the Iowa’s HMO rolls many have soared between 2000 and 2002. For the most part, many
of the states with high HMO penetration rates also have a greater proportion of facilities that
operate under managed care contracts. Other states with facilities that have a large
proportion of managed care contracts include Connecticut, Indiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Connecticut, Vermont, and Rhode Island all exhibit fairly high
rates of HMO penetration. States with the smallest proportion of facilities with managed
care contracts include Mississippi (also a low HMO rate state), Louisiana, Georgia,
Washington D.C., Oklahoma, and, surprisingly, California. California appears to be another
anomaly. Although it is exhibits the highest HMO penetration rate of all the states, it is one
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that ranks near the bottom for smallest proportion of facilities operating under managed care
contracts. Overall, the mean for this variable is calculated as 50.8 with a standard deviation
of 16.40.

The Dependent Variables
Similar to the independent variables, the means of the dependent variables also exhibit
significant variation among the states. The descriptive statistics for overall performance of
alcohol and drug treatment delivery will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of the
volatility, or consistency of states’ alcohol and drug treatment delivery. For a complete
listing of states’ individual performance and volatility scores and how they are ranked, see
Appendix E.

Overall alcohol treatment performance and measures of goal displacement.
The scores for states’ overall alcohol performances, based upon five years of data, range
from a low of -0.3733 to a high of 0.2647, with a mean of -0.000002. The poorest
performance is exhibited by South Dakota. Topping out the bottom ten poorest performers
are Montana (-0.3513), Alaska (-0.2493), Rhode Island (-0.1913), Washington (-0.1613),
Colorado (-0.1421), Massachusetts (-0.1353), Nebraska (-0.1233), Wisconsin and Minnesota
(both at -0.1213), and New Mexico and Indiana (both at -0.0973). It is inferred that these
states experience the greatest levels of goal displacement with respect to meeting the
treatment needs of their citizens who abuse or are dependent upon alcohol.
Texas tops the list as having the best alcohol delivery performance, and thus minimal
goal displacement, with a score of 0.2647. Descending nine positions from the top in order
of best performance are Hawaii (0.1967), California (0.1627), Idaho and Tennessee
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(0.1507), Arizona, Florida, and Alabama (0.1247), Mississippi (0.1227), Pennsylvania and
Illinois (0.1147), Georgia (0.1007), Kentucky (0.0827), and Utah, Oregon, and Arkansas
(0.0767). Therefore, it is these states that are more adept at the meeting the treatment needs
of their citizens that abuse or are dependent upon alcohol. It is hypothesized that goal
displacement is least prevalent in these exceptionally well performing states.
Average performing states with scores around the mean included Ohio, Michigan,
Missouri, and New Hampshire. The shape of the distribution of alcohol performance scores
is relatively normal with a skewness statistic of -0.788 and kurtosis of 0.912.

Overall drug treatment performance and measures of goal displacement.

For the delivery of drug treatment, the scores for states’ overall drug performances are
based upon six years of data, 2001-2006. States scores’ range from a low of -0.4759 to a
high of 0.2008 with a mean of -0.000086. As an extreme outlier, the District of Columbia
ranks the worst, followed by Rhode Island (-0.1472), Alabama (-0.1142), Delaware
(-0.1109), Massachusetts (-0.1059), New York (-0.0825), New Jersey and Virginia
(-0.0509), Wisconsin (-0.0475), Kansas (-.0459), and Montana (-0.0442). It is also inferred
that goal displacement is more prevalent in these states. It is noted that many of these
poorest performing states are located in the northeasterly region which tends to have above
average standards of living.
The best overall performer in the delivery of drug treatment is Alaska. The following
best scoring states are Maine (0.1225), Iowa (0.1108), Hawaii (0.1058), California (0.0975),
Arizona (0.0875), Missouri (0.0841), Oklahoma and Oregon (0.0808), Washington (0.0725),
and Idaho (0.0541). Average performances are exhibited by Wyoming, Pennsylvania,
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Indiana, and New Hampshire. The distribution for drug delivery performance exhibits
considerable negative skewness (-2.363), most likely due to the District of Columbia’s
extreme negative value. The difference between D.C. (-0.4759) and the next lowest score of
Rhode Island (-0.1742) is substantial. The Kurtosis statistic of 11.28 indicates a very high
frequency of values around the mean.
For best performances for both alcohol and drug, Hawaii ranks second in alcohol and
fourth in effective drug treatment. California ranks second in alcohol and fifth in drug
treatment. Arizona, too, ranks high in both treatment areas, as does Idaho. Utah and
Kentucky also demonstrate substantially above average performance in both alcohol and
drug. From these findings it may be inferred that Hawaii, California, Arizona, and Idaho
experience the least goal displacement of any other states in the union.
Such similarities between alcohol and drug performances among the poorest performers
also exist. The most apparent state performing badly in both areas is Rhode Island (yet it is
the most health-insured of all states), ranking fourth worst in alcohol and second worst in
drug treatment. A neighbor to Rhode Island, Delaware, displays the next worst performance
in both treatment areas (seventh in alcohol and fifth in drug). Montana, Wisconsin,
Massachusetts, and Maryland also score low in both treatment areas. Ironically, Maryland is
the state that is home to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s SAMHSA.
From these results, it is generalized that these six states experience the most elevated levels
of goal displacement.
There are many instances in which a state performs well in one area but poorly in the
other. Surprisingly, the District of Columbia, with its frequent outlying values, performs
above average in the delivery of alcohol treatment but worst in drug treatment. Likewise,
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Alabama ranks fifth best in alcohol but third worst in drug. Illinois, too, excels at meeting
the needs of its alcohol dependent populations but struggles with the drug-addicted. New
York and New Jersey rank slightly above average in alcohol performance but are poor
performers in delivery of drug treatment. Opposite of good alcohol delivery and poor drug
treatment is Alaska, ranking third worst in alcohol but best in drug treatment. North Dakota
and Maine are also exceptional in meeting the needs of their alcohol dependent populations
but fail in the arena of drug treatment.
These findings suggest that the internal and external forces that influence goal
displacement as defined by treatment delivery performance are extremely dynamic and that
the approaches states take to address drug and alcohol problems are vastly different.

Consistency of performance.
The volatility of states’ treatment performances as measured by the standard deviations
of their performance means is used to makes inferences about a state’s ability to minimize
goal displacement. As goal setting is a repetitive process of “redefinition” and
“reinterpretation” of organizational goals (Thompson and McEwen 1958), volatile
performance can predispose a bureaucracy to goal displacement by hindering the goal
reevaluation processes that are necessary to achieve organizational objectives.

Alcohol – volatility of goal displacement.
For alcohol performance, volatility scores range from high of 0.3655 in South Dakota to
low of 0.0450 in Wisconsin. This indicates that Wisconsin is most consistent of all states in
the delivery of alcohol treatment. However, Wisconsin, renown for its beer producing
heritage, ranks ninth worst in performance, thereby signifying the state’s consistently
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elevated levels of goal displacement in the delivery of treatment. South Dakota, conversely,
is the least stable but also exhibits the highest level of goal displacement with respect to
alcohol treatment. Following South Dakota in volatility are Alaska (0.3084), Massachusetts
(0.3067), Kentucky (0.2771), New Mexico (0.26223), Rhode Island (.2550), Utah (0.2462),
and Maine (0.2383). For the most consistent performances, Wisconsin is followed by
California (0.0465), Tennessee (0.0485), Florida (0.0487), Michigan (0.00584), Ohio
(0.0601), New York (0.0646), Ohio (0.0972), Delaware (0.0673), and Mississippi (0.0724).
States whose volatility measures fell near the mean of 0.1545 include Kansas, South
Carolina, Wyoming, Iowa, and West Virginia. Levels of goal displacement in these states
are neither unstable nor stable.
In comparing overall alcohol performance and volatility, Alaska, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts and Maryland reveal both poor performance and high levels of volatility,
whereas Montana, Delaware, and Wisconsin demonstrate relatively consistent poor
performances, California, Idaho, Tennessee, Florida, and Mississippi demonstrate good
stable performances. Top performers Texas and Hawaii show relatively inconsistent levels
of goal displacement.

Drug – volatility of goal displacement.
In terms of volatility of drug treatment delivery, the District of Columbia fares worst
(0.2282), followed by Alaska (0.1843), Rhode Island (0.1798), Alabama (0.1573), Louisiana
(0.1559), West Virginia (0.1439), Connecticut (0.1414), Virginia (0.1369), Kansas (0.1358),
and Hawaii (0.1318). The most stable performances are demonstrated by Illinois and
Maryland (0.036), followed by Texas (0.0309), Missouri (.0358), Georgia (0.0437),
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Vermont (0.0509), North Carolina (.0529) Pennsylvania (0.0541), Arkansas (0.0563), and
Idaho (0.0570). States whose volatility measures fell near the mean of 0.0908 included
Minnesota, New Jersey, Kentucky, and South Dakota.
When comparing states’ drug performances to their corresponding levels of volatility to
make generalizations about goal displacement, it is apparent that Washington D.C.,
Alabama, Massachusetts, Virginia, Delaware, and Rhode Island experience the most
elevated levels of goal displacement. These six states demonstrate both poor and
inconsistent performances. It is inferred that California, Maine, Iowa, Idaho, and North
Dakota experience the least displacement as these states score relatively high in performance
and above average in consistency. Alaska, although being the best at meeting the needs of
their drug dependent population, ranks the second worst in volatility. Hawaii and Arizona
are very similar. Although these two states rank in the top ten of best performances, they
score near the bottom for worst volatility. Conversely, Maryland and Illinois exhibit highly
consistent but below average performances.
Overall, in evaluating states’ delivery performances of alcohol and drug treatment, the
rankings suggest that Hawaii, California, Arizona, and Idaho, by far, experience the least
goal displacement of all the states. As it is difficult to accurately assess overall levels of
goal displacement with respect to volatility measures, by comparing the states among the
four different types of rankings, it can be proposed that Idaho and California experience
minimal goal displacement with the least amount of volatility. The corresponding drug and
alcohol volatility measures for Iowa are both above average, thereby signifying that its
propensity for goal displacement is fairly stable. That Hawaii exhibits relatively extreme
volatility in both drug and alcohol treatment yet still demonstrates exceptional performance
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in both areas indicates it has mastered techniques to overcome goal displacement. Arizona is
also very proficient in overcoming goal displacement as it scores exceptionally well in both
types of performance but experiences high volatility in drug and average in alcohol.
Therefore all of these aforementioned states experience minimal goal displacement.
In contrast, Rhode Island appears to be the state that experiences the highest level of goal
displacement, scoring poorly for both alcohol and drug with extreme levels of volatility.
Delaware, Montana, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Maryland are also shown to experience
elevated levels of goal displacement. These states perform poorly for alcohol and drug
treatment with varying levels of volatility. However, for the purposes of inferring goal
displacement, the scores for drug treatment performance should be given more weight than
alcohol performance because alcohol use is so widely marketed and socially endorsed. Such
practices have undoubtedly contributed to our laissez-faire attitude towards its use. The
stigma attached to its alcohol abuse does not measure up to that of illicit drugs. America, for
the most part and relative to drug abuse, has been anesthetized to the ills and dangers of
alcohol dependence and abuse. Conversely, the spread of drug use has generally always
been reason for alarm, a call to action to wage war on drug use through stricter enforcement
measures.

Bivariate Correlations
In calculating bivariate correlations, multicollinearity (R = 0.937) is found between per
capita full-time equivalent government employees per 1000 and per capita government
payroll per 1000. Therefore, the two are not used together in further multivariate analyses.
Two sets of additional variables illustrate bivariate correlations of above R = 0.700, percent
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distribution of public facilities and of private non-profit facilities (R = -0.701), and percent
distribution of private for-profit and percentage of facilities that receive public funding for
substance abuse treatment programs (-0.727). However, these correlations are not
surprising. Studies have shown that for-profit facilities are financed primarily with private
monies (Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992; Wheeler and Nahra 2000), therefore a
statistically negative correlation between for-profit facilities and percentage of facilities that
receive public funds is expected. Nor is the negative correlation between public and nonprofit facilities a revelation. In inspecting states’ distributions of facilities, it appears that
states that have few public facilities have proportionally more non-profit facilities.
Conversely, states that demonstrate a large distribution of public facilities generally have
smaller distributions of non-profits. This suggests the possibility that non-profits enter and
operate in markets where need is great and supply is sparse, or perhaps it is public facilities
that fill the supply gap where there is an absence of non-profits. However, it is most likely
that the first premise holds true.
Numerous statistically significant bivariate correlations at the 0.01 and 0.05 level are
observed. Several of the internal task environment variables are significantly correlated to
one another: both types of block grant funding to government administration, government
administration to FTE government employees and payroll, and the state revenues and
expenditures ratio to government payroll and FTE employees. From this it may be inferred
that associations exist between a bureaucracy’s size and spending for self-maintenance.
Among the external task environment variables, positive relationships are shown to exist
between household income and government payroll and administration. Could this imply
that with an increase in household income comes the increased tax revenues that are vital for
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growing state bureaucracies? Also noted are the positive correlations between facility
characteristics and the external task variables of populations without insurance and those
receiving public aid, and between AIAN populations and facilities that provide care at no
cost. Positive correlations are revealed between population without insurance and
distribution of public facilities and population receiving public aid to distribution of nonprofits. This suggests that states may offer increased availability of treatment to those
populations that are most in need. Increased treatment access to disadvantaged populations
is also inferred by a positive correlation between percentage of a population receiving public
aid and numbers of clients treated.
Additionally, a positive correlation (.536) between HMO penetration rates and clients in
treatment lends preliminary credence to prior research findings that access to treatment is
increased where managed care is prevalent.

Paired Sample T-Tests
Comparison of T1 and T2 Independent Variables
Next, separate paired t-tests analyses were conducted. The first is performed using the T1
variables with the corresponding T2 variables to discern if differences exist between the
variables’ means for the two time periods. A second t-test analysis was conducted to
distinguish if states’ yearly dependence rates, gaps, and performance means for any two
consecutive years differ significantly form one another. The results follow.
From T1 to T2, significant differences between the means at the 0.01 level are found in
the following variables: median household income, population without insurance, AIAN
population, distribution of private for-profits, HMO rates, facilities with managed care
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contracts, block grant expenditures for prevention, government administration, government
full-time employees, and government payroll. Of these, all demonstrated mean increases
from T1 to T2 except HMO penetration rates, facilities with managed care contracts, and
full-time government employees. Ironically, there is a statistically significant reduction in
full-time government employees but statistically significant increases in government payroll
and in government administration. This supports the theory of economic displacement
premise of Henry (2001) as to why government continues to grow.
Significant differences between the means at the 0.05 level are observed in population
receiving public aid, facilities receiving public funding, and the ratio of state revenues to
expenditures. Whereas decreases occurred in numbers of public aid recipients and facilities
that receive public funding, the financial resources of states grew between the two time
periods. Marginal differences were observed in facilities that treat at no charge (a decrease),
and block grant expenditures for treatment (an increase). The remaining variables, infant
mortality, distribution of private non-profits and public facilities, treatment gaps for alcohol
and drug, clients, and ratio of inpatient to outpatients demonstrate no appreciable differences
in their means between the two time periods.
In terms of external task environment, the results suggest that although median income
had risen, the percentage of the population that lacked insurance grew, yet there is a
decrease in the percentage of population receiving public aid. Populations were less
dependent upon public aid, yet more people were going without health care coverage. These
changes emphasize the ongoing and growing crisis of lack of affordable health care.
However, it is noted that the T1 and T2 variables for public aid recipients are for years 2000
and 2003, respectively, and for population without insurance, years 1998-2000 and 2002-
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2004, respectively. The significant changes in the means of the two variables may be offset,
or perhaps amplified, by the mismatched time periods.
Not only did several of the external task variables change between T1 and T2 but also a
number of internal task variables. The findings reveal increases in Block Grant funding,
growth in the employment expenditures of government, an increase in states’ financial
resources, but no appreciable differences in the gap between persons in need of, but not in
receipt of, alcohol and drug treatment.
Supply and delivery of treatment characteristics demonstrate growth in the for-profit
sector and a reduction in facilities that receive public funding, as well as a reduction in those
that offer treatment at no cost. The managed care variables indicate a decrease in HMO
rates and a reduction in facilities that operate under managed care contracts.
From these results, it appears that the segmentation of the market, as claimed by previous
research researchers (Wheeler and Nahra 2000; Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno 1992;
Friedmann, Alexander, and D’Aunno 1999; Rodgers and Barnett 2000; and Roman,
Ducharme, and Knuden 2006) continues to increase. The findings suggest that although the
federal government has increased block grant funding, state government continues to grow,
public funding to treatment facilities is decreasing, facilities are less likely to offer free
treatment, and the growth of the for-profit sector is thriving. These changes spell out a
hazardous equation, pointing toward further market segmentation for substance abuse
treatment. Those who will be most in need will likely be least able to obtain treatment.
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Comparisons in Treatment Gap, Dependence, and Performance
Another set of paired T-tests were conducted to distinguish if states’ yearly dependence
rates, treatment gaps, or levels of goal displacement as inferred by their performance means
for any two consecutive years for both alcohol and drug differed significantly from one
another. Using the drug data the years were paired as follows: 2001 and 2002, 2002 and
2003, 2003 and 2004, 2004 and 2005. The same procedure was performed using the alcohol
data, but the paired years 2001 and 2002 were omitted as complete data for 2001 were not
available.
No significant differences between the means for any two consecutive years are
discerned for alcohol performance, alcohol treatment gaps, or alcohol dependence rates. For
alcohol performance, the levels of significance for the four consecutively paired years do not
drop beneath 0.997. The significance levels for alcohol treatment gap range from 0.410 to
0.874 and from 0.422 to 0.946 for alcohol dependence and abuse rates.
Similar to alcohol performance, the means for the drug performance for any two
consecutive years did not differ significantly. However, for paired years 2001 and 2002 and
2005 and 2006, differences between the means at the .01 level for drug treatment gap are
revealed. The mean for the drug treatment gap rose from 1.972 in 2001 to 2.712 in 2002, a
considerable and alarming increase. From 2005 to 2006 the nation experienced a significant
decrease, from 2.682 to 2.574, in persons reporting needing but not receiving treatment. The
nation’s drug dependence rates mirrored a similar escalation and decline as unmet treatment
needs did for the same two sets of paired years. Drug dependence rates rose from 2.223 to
3.049 from 2001 to 2002, and then dropped from 2.682 to 2.575 from 2005 to 2006.
According to the renowned investigation of an Oregonian staff writer (Suo 2004), this
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acceleration in dependence and unmet need for treatment could have been in part due to the
debilitating and expanding spread of methamphetamine abuse in the early 2000s. Among
the remaining paired years for both treatment gap and dependence rates, no appreciable
differences are discerned.
Two additional paired t-tests were conducted comparing 2002 to 2005 drug and alcohol
performances, but no statistically significant differences were discovered for either type of
performance. Although changes occur in many of the independent variables between the
two time periods, no appreciable differences occur in states’ levels of goal displacement
between T1 and T2. The paired t-test results for alcohol illustrate the relative stability of
alcohol abuse rates as well as for proportions of states’ populations that are in need of, but
not in receipt of, treatment.

One-Way ANOVA
Drug Performance (Goal Displacement) and Volatility
One-Way Analyses of Variances were conducted to examine regional differences in
levels of overall performance and volatility for both alcohol and drugs. In all runs, the Post
Hoc test of Least Significant Difference (LSD) is used to test for pairwise comparisons.
Because these analyses are regional in scope and because a state’s level of goal
displacement is inferred by its individual performance measurement and not as a regional
phenomenon, the term goal displacement will not be used here, but rather regional
performance.
In examining regions’ overall drug performances, Levene’s test for homogeneity of
variance indicates that the variances for performance for each of the eight U.S. regions differ
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significantly (p = .036). The regional standard deviations range from a high of 0.1762 in the
Mid East (DE, D.C. , MD, NJ, NY, and PA) to a low of 0.0221 in the Great Lakes (IL, IN,
MI, OH, and WI). Significant differences were found to exist within the regional
comparisons (p = 0.001). Of the six years, the Mid East states exhibit the poorest drug
performance, followed by the Great Lakes and New England. To which extent the
exceptionally poor performances of District of Columbia negatively contributed to the
region as a whole is confirmed by excluding D.C. and re-running the analysis. Upon doing
so, Levene’s test statistic is no longer significant (p = 0.174); however, the ANOVA model
remained significant at the 0.01 level. Although the exclusion of D.C. still results in the
Mid East as having the poorest regional performance, the mean decreased from -0.1253 to a
more modest -0.055 and the standard deviation dropped from 0.1762 to 0.0440. This
comparison illustrates how the negative and highly volatile performance of D.C. influences
the region’s results.
With the inclusion of D.C., pairwise comparisons indicate that many of statistically
significant differences at the .01 level are attributable to the poor performance of the Mid
East region. The difference between the two worst performing regions, the Mid East and the
Great Lakes, is still fairly substantial with a level of significance of 0.055. The Far West
(AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, and WA) demonstrate the best performance of all regions, followed
by the Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, and TX) and the Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, and
SD). These three regions exhibit no statistically significant differences among one another.
Excluding D.C., pairwise comparisons illustrate that the majority of statistically
significant differences at the .01 are attributed to the exceptional performance of the Far
West.
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For volatility, Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance reveals that the variances for
consistency of drug treatment delivery for each of the eight U.S. regions do not differ
significantly (p = 0.350), nor do significant differences exist within the regional
comparisons (p = 0.716).

Alcohol Performance (Goal Displacement) and Volatility
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance indicates a marginal difference in variances
for overall alcohol performance for each of the eight U.S. regions (p = .057). The most
extreme variation is witnessed by the Rocky Mountains (standard deviation = 0.1968) and
the least by the Southeast (0.0699). No significant differences are found to exist within the
regional comparisons (p = 0.091) and 2006 (p = 0.03), thus confirming the relative stability
of the states’ response to alcohol problems.
No significant differences in variances for regions’ consistencies for delivery were
discerned (p = 0.775) or for within regional comparisons (p = 0.250).

Linear Regression
Goal Displacement in the Delivery of Drug Treatment
Table 2 presents the results for the original linear regression model using the T1 data
with the Enter Method to explain states’ level of goal displacement with respect to its
delivery of drug treatment. Two external task environment variables (IMR and AIAN) are
significant at the 0.05 level as well as one facility supply variable (NoChrg) that are
hypothesized to predict a state’s delivery of substance abuse treatment. Only the internal
task environment variable of GAPAlc is significant. Marginally significant are GAPDrg and
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PNP. The model, statistically significant at the .001 level, explains 86% of the variance in
states’ levels of goal displacement.
The relationships of three of the six significant or marginally significant independent
variables to goal displacement support the stated hypotheses. Two are contradictory. (The
reader is reminded that a higher performance score is associated with a lower level of goal
displacement; therefore, the interpretation of the sign of the coefficients is inverse.) States
that have higher rates of IMR exhibit greater levels of goal displacement as hypothesized.
Likewise, as states’ alcohol treatment gaps increase, so too do their levels of goal
displacement. But the opposite effect is shown for the predictor of GAPDrg. Increases in
states’ drug treatment gaps are associated with decreases in goal displacement. From this
finding it may be presumed that states respond more to their drug abuse problems than to
alcohol abuse. In support of the hypothesis, greater levels of goal displacement are also
present in states with greater proportions of facilities that treat at no charge. Contrary to the
stated hypotheses, increases in AIAN populations are associated with decreased levels of
goal displacement. This implies that many states with high AIAN populations are
reasonably adequate in meeting the drug treatment needs of their citizens. The ranking table
presented in Appendix IV reaffirms this finding. Alaska, Arizona, North Dakota, and New
Mexico, states with large percentages of AIAN, exhibit minimal levels of goal displacement.
Although no hypothesis is formed regarding states’ distribution of non-profit facilities, the
table below reports that increases in non-profits are associated with lower levels of goal
displacement. The results imply that non-profits may be somewhat instrumental in helping
states meet the treatment needs of those requiring care, thus in support of findings (Heinrich
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and Fournier 2004, 2005) that non-profits were more effective than public and for-profits in
reducing the number of drugs patients used after completion of treatment.

Table 2 – Regression results of drug
performance w/o volatility measure
Unstand.
Stand.
T
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant -.020
-.049
.961
MHHInc -3.95E-006 -.282
-1.737 .094
IMR
-.020
-.315
-2.768 .010
AIAN
.021
.660
3.412 .002
PNP
.007
1.182 1.993 .057
NoChrg -.004
-.553
-3.584 .001
GAPAlc -.035
-.397
-3.932 .001
GAPDrg .075
.249
2.001 .056
R
.928
R Sq.
.861
F Ratio
6.699
Sig.
.000
*dependent variable – OvAllDRG w/o ConsistDRG

Consistency in the delivery of drug treatment.
PerfDRG is removed as the dependent variable and replaced by ConsistDRG to examine
the impact the same predictor variables have on a state’s goal displacement volatility. For
the sake of brevity and because of the model’s lack of significance, a table of results is not
provided. As the model is not significant (p = 0.116), those variables that contribute
explanatory power to the goal displacement model do not explain consistency of goal
displacement or lack thereof. However, three different variables are significant at the .05
level: GOVTAdm (p = .024), GOVTPyrl (p = .043)11, and MMBenf (p = .025). What is
interesting to note is that relationships of GOVTAdm and GOVTPyrl to volatility of goal
displacement are positive. As a state’s payroll and per capita administration increases, so
11

Additional regressions were performed conducted substituting FTEEmpl for GOVTPyrl to discern if the
replacement would alter the results but it did not.
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does its volatility. Although the model is not significant, this finding suggests that the size
of government, as measured by administration and payroll expenditures, inversely impacts
the stability necessary to achieve the state objective of providing effective treatment.
Looking at the model overall, it is clear that the variables that influence a state’s level of
goal displacement do not influence its stability or volatility.
Referring to Thompson and McEwen’s (1958) position that volatility impedes the goal
redefining and reinterpretation processes that are critical to goal attainment (a state
adequately meeting the needs of its abusing and dependent populations), the drug
performance measurement is regressed upon the same set of independent variables, but the
dependent variable ConsistDrg is entered as an additional independent variable. It is
believed that a state’s volatility of delivery should impact level of goal displacement itself in
a negative manner. Table 3 below illustrates this supposition to be true. The revised
model, significant at the 0.001 level, explains an additional two percent (88%) of the
variance in states’ levels of goal displacement. ConsistDrg is significant at p = 0.049 and
the nature of the correlation is negative as expected. As a state’s volatility increases, goal
displacement increases. Of the six variables that were found to be significant or marginally
significant in the original regression run, five remain significant and the directions of all the
relationships remain unchanged. The 0.01 significance levels of the variables IMR, AIAN,
NoChrg, and GAPAlc remain unaffected, and the variable GAPDrg contributes slightly
more to the model. The variable CLIENTS become marginally significant where it had not
been in the prior run, and its positive relationship to goal displacement is as hypothesized.
Another change that occurs is the increase in the explanatory contribution of MHHInc.
Significant only at p = .094 in the first model, the variable becomes statistically significant
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in the second (p = .050), but the relationship is contrary to what is hypothesized. The model
indicates that as a state’s median household income increases, so too does its level of goal
displacement.

Table 3 – Regression results of drug
performance w/volatility measure
Unstand.
Stand.
t
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant
.207
.514
.612
MHHInc
-4.44E-006 -.317
-2.058 .050
IMR
-.021
-.343
-3.173 .004
AIAN
.019
.582
3.126 .004
PNP
.007
1.115
2.119 .044
NoChrg
-.004
-.477
-3.185 .004
CLIENTS
-000
-.307
-1.875 .073
GOVTPryl
1.13E-006 .269
1.907 .068
GAPAlc
-.033
-.379
-3.969 .001
GAPDrg
.078
.261
2.219 .036
ConsistDRG -.504
-.226
-2.073 .049
.939
R
.881
R Sq.
7.418
F Ratio
.000
Sig.
*dependent variable – OvAllDRG w/ConsistDRG

Goal Displacement and Consistency in the Delivery of Alcohol Treatment
The same independent variables that were used in the Drug Delivery model are used to
assess states’ levels of goal displacement with respect to the delivery of alcohol treatment.
As Table 4 reports, the model is significant at the 0.001 level, explaining ninety-one percent
of the variance in states’ levels of alcohol goal displacement. Only two variables, GAPAlc
and PNP, that are significant in the drug goal displacement model offer explanatory power
to the alcohol model. The directions of the relationships remain unchanged, but whereas the
significance level of GAPAlc remains relatively the same, PNP demonstrates a greater level
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of significance in the alcohol model. This suggests that non-profits are more influential in
diverting goal displacement in alcohol treatment than in drug. Several other independent
variables not significant in the drug model emerged as significant in this model, thus
signifying that variables that explain states’ level of drug goal displacement are not
instrumental in explaining it with respect to delivery of alcohol treatment. One external task
environment variable, W/OIns, contributes to alcohol goal displacement, but the relationship
is contrary to what is hypothesized. Increases in states’ uninsured populations are associated
with decreased goal displacement. Could this suggest that states are responding to the
alcohol treatment needs of their uninsured?
Several treatment supply characteristics also are significant in the model, the distributions
of all types of facilities (PNP, PFP, and PUB) and clients in treatment. Increases in all
facility types are associated with decreased goal displacement. This finding contradicts the
hypothesis regarding a state’s distribution of public facilities. The for-profit facility
hypothesis is supported, but it is noted that the significance level of PUB is slightly more
significant than that of PFP. However, from a rationale perspective, increases in all three
types of facilities should be associated with decreased levels of goal displacement because
more unmet treatment is being satisfied by the increased distributions of all facilities. As
hypothesized, increases in the number of clients in treatment are also associated with
increased levels of goal displacement.
In this model, the internal task environment variable of GOVTAdm is found to be
significant at the 0.05 level; however, the direction of the relationship is opposite to what is
hypothesized. The results suggest that as administration costs increase, goal displacement
decreases, thereby implying that government is fulfilling its task of meeting the needs of
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their alcohol-dependent populations. Additionally, the presence of any one of three types of
parity laws is also associated with increased levels of goal displacement, but it is noted that
the most basic of all laws, one which offers the least amount of parity, is the more
significant.

Table 4 – Regression results of alcohol
performance w/o volatility measure
Unstand. Stand.
t
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant
-1.086
-1.727 .096
W/OIns
.021
.591
3.943 .001
PNP
.014
1.729
2.58 .016
PFP
.013
1.144 2.248 .033
PUB
.014
1.293 2.670 .013
CLIENTS
.000
-.546 -2.795 .010
GOVTAdm
.000
.358
2.064 .049
PARITY
-.150
-.425 -2.557 .017
MMBenf
-.100
-.374 -2.251 .033
MandOF
-.117
-.429 -2.698 .012
GAPAlc
-.026
-.220 -1.930 .065
.907
R
.822
R Sq.
5.013
F Ratio
.000
Sig.
*dependent variable – OvAllAlc w/o ConsistALC

Repeating the dependent variable substitution that had been performed for the drug
model, the volatility measure, ConsistAlc, is regressed on the same set of independent
variables. But as the model is not found to be significant, the table is omitted. The only
variable found to be significant below the .05 is IMR (0.032) and its positive relationship to
goal displacement is as hypothesized. The results of both alcohol and drug volatility models
suggest that neither set of independent variables explains the presence or absence of goal
displacement volatility.
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In the next model, OvAllAlc is again regressed on the T2 independent variable but with
the addition of ConsistAlc as an independent variable. The results, presented in Table 5, are
fairly similar to the alcohol displacement model that includes the volatility measure. The
significance levels of the variables that offer explanatory power in the first model remain
relatively unchanged except for that of GAPAlc and GOVTAdm, both of which lose their
prior marginal significances in attendance of ConsistAlc. It is interesting to note, however,
that the alcohol volatility measure is not significant in this model (p = 0.196), but when the
drug volatility measure is included in the drug goal displacement model, it contributes
explanatory power (p = 0.049). This finding suggests that volatility impedes the effective
delivery of drug treatment, causing greater levels of goal displacement significantly more so
than in the delivery of alcohol treatment.

Table 5 – Regression results of alcohol
performance w/volatility measure
Unstand. Stand.
t
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant
-1.078
-1.740 .094
W/OIns
.018
.526
3.376 .002
PNP
.014
1.801 2.717 .012
PFP
.015
1.295 2.517 .019
PUB
.015
1.387 2.874 .008
CLIENTS
.000
-.488 -2.467 .021
GOVTAdm
.000
.323
1.867 .074
PARITY
-.148
-.417 -2.548 .017
MMBenf
-.098
-.368 -2.248 .034
MandOF
-.120
-.43
-2.790 .010
GAPAlc
-.023
-.195 -1.709 .100
.913
R
.834
R Sq.
5.024
F Ratio
.000
Sig.
*dependent variable – OvAllAlc w/ConsistAlc
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Comparing Results from 2002 to 2005 Findings
Goal displacement in the delivery of drug treatment.
A second set of data, dated three years later than the original set for the independent
variables, was collected from the same sources and analyzed using linear regression. Table
6 below presents both sets of results for goal displacement with respect to the delivery of
drug treatment. For illustrative purposes, all variables that are statistically significant or
marginally significant in both models are included.

Table 6 – Comparison of T1 and T2 results of
drug performance w/o volatility measure
T2
T1
T1
T1
Unstand.
Unstand.
t
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant
-.020
-.049 .961
-.656
MHHInc -3.95E-006 -1.737 .094
-4.36E-006
W/OIns
.002
.547 .589
.010
IMR
-.020
-2.768 .010
-.011
AIAN
.021
3.412 .002
.010
PNP
.007
1.993 .057
.006
NoChrg
-.004
-3.584 .001
-.002
GOVTPryl 6.55E-007 1.133 .268
1.32E-006
REV/EXP
.048
1.015 .319
.224
GAPAlc
-.035
-3.932 .001
.001
GAPDrg
.075
2.001 .056
.078
.928
.902
R
.861
.813
R Sq.
6.699
4.711
F Ratio
.000
.000
Sig.
* dependent variable – OvAllDrg w/o ConsistDRG

T2

T2

t

Sig.

-1.304
-1.748
1.984
-1.140
1.391
1.495
-2.119
2.029
2.049
.057
1.852

.204
.092
.058
.265
.176
.147
.044
.053
.051
.955
.075

As the table reports, the T2 model remains significant, but the powers of several
independent variables alter. Many that are not statistically significant in the T1 Model
become marginally significant in the second model: W/OIns, GOVTPyrl, and REV/EXP.
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However, the relationships of W/OIns and GOVTPryl to level of goal displacement
contradict what is hypothesized. Increases in each of these variables are associated with
reduced levels of goal displacement. The relationship of states’ financial position
(REV/EXP) to displacement is as predicted. As state wealth increases, displacement
decreases.
Just as these variables gain explanatory power in the T2 model, several variables lose
their significance in the T2 model: IMR, AIAN, PNP, and GAPAlc. The internal task
environment variable of GAPAlc drastically loses its prior significance of p = 0.001 that it
exhibited in the T1 model. These four variables no longer contribute to a state’s level of
goal displacement. GAPDrg and MHHInc remain relatively unchanged and the contribution
of NoChrg to the model weakens. The changes between T1 and T2 suggest that states are
responding to the drug abuse problem. More people are going uninsured, yet the variable’s
correlation to goal displacement is negative. As states’ employment payrolls, state coffers,
and drug treatment gaps increase, goal displacement is also found to decrease. If this
premise is in fact true, what factors have fueled state governments’ increased responses to
substance abuse treatment?
The peculiarity of this model is the changes in GAPAlc. In both models, increases in
GAPDrg are shown to minimize drug goal displacement. This implies that states recognize
the needs of their drug abusing populations. In the T1 model, as GAPAlc increases, goal
displacement increases. However, in the T2 model, GAPAlc, having lost its significance,
has no effect yet drug goal displacement. This change in GAPAlc suggests that in
responding to unmet drug treatment needs, states are better at serving the alcohol abusing
populations because the two addictions are generally mutually inclusive.
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The second variable that exhibits a marginal level significance in the T2 model where it
did not in the first is REV/EXP. Its relationship to goal displacement supports the
hypothesis that states with greater financial resources are in better positions to divert goal
displacement and therefore exhibit lower levels of displacement.

Consistency in the delivery of drug treatment.
Regressing Consistency of Drug Performance on the T2 independent variables yields a
lower level of significance (p = .173) for the overall model than the T1 (p = .116). Only one
variable, GOVTAdm, is found to be marginally significant (p = .074). It is evident that
volatility of drug goal displacement remains largely unexplained by the T2 independent
variables.
The goal displacement model when OvAllDrg is regressed on the T2 independent
variables is found to be significant when the volatility measure is included in the goal
displacement model as was found in the T1 model.
Incorporating the consistency measurement finds the T2 model slightly less significant
than the T1 model, but the explanatory powers of several variables are altered as illustrated
by Table 7 below.
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Table 7 - Comparison of T1 and T2 results of
drug performance w/volatility measure
T2
T1
T1
T1
Unstand.
Unstand.
t
Sig.
Coeff
Coeff
Constant
.207
.514 .612
-.401
MHHInc
-4.44E-006 -2.058 .050
-4.44E-006
IMR
-.021
-3.173 .004
-.012
AIAN
.019
3.126 .004
.010
PNP
.007
2.119 .044
.005
NoChrg
-.004
-3.185 .004
-.002
CLIENTS
.000
-1.875 .073
-4.31E-005
GOVTPryl
1.13E-006 1.907 .068
1.43E-006
GAPAlc
-.033
-3.969 .001
.001
REV/EXP
.029
.623 .539
.200
GAPDrg
.078
2.219 .036
.066
ConsistDRG
-.504
-2.073 .049
-.503
.939
.914
R
.881
.835
R Sq.
7.418
5.048
F Ratio
.000
.000
Sig.
*dependent variable – OvAllDrg w/ ConsistDRG

T2

T2

t

Sig.

-.797
-1.855
-1.370
1.502
1.316
2.073
-.637
2.272
.066
1.885
1.592
-1.808

.433
.075
.183
.146
.200
.049
.530
.032
.948
.071
.124
.083

As results illustrate, several external task environment variables (MHHInc, IMR, and
AIAN) and the facility characteristic variables (PNP, NoChrg, and CLIENTS) lose their
statistical significance in the T2 model and the two internal task environment variables of
GOVTPyrl and REV/EXP gain explanatory power. Similar to the original T2 model without
the inclusion of the consistency measure, GAPAlc drastically loses its prior significance of p
= 0.001 in the T1 model. Again, what explains drug goal displacement among the states in
2002 does not explain the phenomenon as it occurs in 2005. Comparison of the two sets of
results indicate that from T1 to T2, internal task environment variables of bureaucracy have
surpassed external task environment and facility characteristic variables in explaining states’
levels of goal displacement.

90

Comparing Results from 2002 to 2005 Findings
Goal displacement in the delivery of alcohol treatment.
Table 8 reports the comparison between 2002 and 2005 model of goal displacement
within the realm of alcohol treatment. As the results illustrate, the 2005 model is slightly
less significant than the 2002 model. Similar to the earlier model are the predictive factors
of W/OIns and distributions of all facility types, although the explanatory powers of the
three facility types become more prominent. This may be reflective of an increased
importance of treatment availability. GAPAlc and GOVTAdm are observed to lose
significance as do the three types of parity laws. The mandated offering law remains
marginally significant, and its association to goal displacement is positive, which is
justifiable on the grounds that it is the most rudimentary of the three laws and, therefore,
should have a greater link to goal displacement than the two other types, which are
presumed to offer greater access to healthcare. In the later model, clients in treatment are
also found to be less of a predictor of displacement. Interestingly, GOVTAdm loses its
significance in the second model, but it is replaced by the marginal significance of
GOVTPyrl in the latter. However, both of the government variables’ relationships to goal
displacement contradict what is hypothesized. The results indicate that increases in
government payroll and administration are found among states with lower levels of goal
displacement, thereby suggesting that bigger government may be better at meeting the needs
of their uninsured, substance-abusing populations through the availability of public
facilities. Another difference between T1 and T2 is the effect of MHHInc. Not significant in
the first model, a marginal significance of 0.060 is reported in the latter, but again, the
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results contradict the hypothesis that lower levels of goal displacement would be present in
states with higher median household incomes.

Table 8 - Comparison of T1 and T2 results of
alcohol performance w/o volatility measure
T1

T1

T1

T2
Unstand.
Unstand.
t
Sig.
Coeffic
Coeffic
Constant
-1.086
-1.727 .096
-1.550
MHHInc
-6.01E-006 -.865 .395 -7.78E-006
W/OIns
.021
3.943 .001
.029
PNP
.014
2.580 .016
.019
PFP
.013
2.248 .033
.018
PUB
.014
2.670 .013
.019
CLIENTS
.000
-2.795 .010
.000
GOVTAdm
.000
2.064 .049 9.05E-005
GOVTPyrl 4.31E-007
.489 .629 1.99E-006
PARITY
-.150
-2.557 .017
-.108
MMBenf
-.100
-2.251 .033
-.075
MANOf
-.117
-2.698 .012
-.106
GAPAlc
-.026
-1.930 .065
-.017
R
.907
.861
R Sq.
.822
.742
F
5.013
3.109
Sig.
.000
.003
*dependent variable – OvAllAlc w/o ConsistALC

T2

T2

t

Sig.

-1.939
-1.964
3.818
3.062
2.655
2.920
-2.084
.494
1.922
-1.617
-1.383
-1.867
-.995

.063
.060
.001
.005
.013
.007
.047
.625
.066
.118
.179
.073
.329

Similar to findings reported in the T1 model, regressing ConsistALC on the independent
variables in T2 model yield no statistical significance (0.409). Because of this result, no
further elaboration will be provided although it can be inferred that for both T1 and T2
models for both alcohol and drugs, no statistically significant relationship is found between
the sets of variables and volatility of goal displacement.
Table 9 reports the comparison between the T1 and T2 models where performance (level
of goal displacement) is regressed on the independent variables and the consistency
measurement is included.
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Table 9 - Comparison of T1 and T2 results of
alcohol performance w/volatility measure
T1
T1
T2
T1
Unstand.
Unstand.
t
Sig.
Coeffic
Coeffic
Constant
-1.078
-1.740 .094
-1.727
MHHInc
-3.25E-006 -.948 .352 -7.31E-006
W/OIns
.018
3.376 .002
.026
PNP
.014
2.717 .012
.020
PFP
.015
2.517 .019
.020
PUB
.015
2.874 .008
.020
CLIENTS
.000
-2.467 .021
.000
GOVTAdm
.000
1.867 .074 5.71E-005
GOVTPyrl
6.90E-006
.774 .446 2.03E-006
PARITY
-.148
-2.548 .017
-.100
MMBenf
-.098
-2.248 .034
-.068
MANOf
-.120
-2.790 .010
-.100
ConsistALC
-.262
-1.328 .196
-.688
R
.913
.870
R Sq.
.834
.756
F
5.024
3.10
Sig.
.000
.003
*dependent variable – OvAllALC w/ConsistALC

T2

T2

t

Sig.

-2.145
-1.853
3.264
3.216
2.880
3.081
-1.716
.312
1.980
-1.507
-1.247
-1.762
-1.219

.042
.076
.003
.004
.008
.005
.099
.758
.059
.144
.224
.090
.234

As the Table 9 demonstrates, the amount of variance explained in goal displacement by
the independent variables remained relatively unchanged from 2002 to 2005, and the effects
each variable has on goal displacement are very similar to the results presented in the
previous table that compared the difference between T1 and T2 without the inclusion of the
consistency measure. The variable MHHInc becomes marginally significant and W/OIns
remains relatively the same. Whereas the distributions of each of the facility types gain
significance, the three types of parity laws lose importance. The former explanatory power
of CLIENT is diminished and the marginal significance of GOVTAdm is replaced by the
now-present marginal significance of GOVTPyrl. Essentially, the differences between the
T1 and T2 models, which include ConsistALC, are no different than the differences between
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the T1 and T2 models that exclude ConsistALC. This implies that volatility does not predict
goal displacement in either of the two time periods under study.
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Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusion
The thesis research indicates that a mix of internal and external environmental
characteristics impacts states’ levels of goal displacement as measured by state delivery
performances. This study also supports existing theory that the internal and external
environment of an organization does not remain static but is fluid. Each state possesses
unique internal and external task demand characteristics that not only affect the success or
failure in meeting the needs of its addicted populations but that also change over time. The
findings suggest that considerable differences exist between the goal displacement that
occurs in the delivery of alcohol treatment and that which occurs in drug treatment. The
environmental factors that are found to affect goal displacement in drug treatment delivery
are not the same as those that influence it with respect to alcohol, and whereas the delivery
of alcohol treatment is relatively stable, drug is highly volatile.
The examination of the changes that took place between the two time periods suggests
that household wealth is growing, yet more citizens are finding themselves without health
insurance coverage. This, coupled with the findings that states’ distribution of private forprofit facilities is increasing, managed care rolls are declining, and fewer facilities are
receiving public funds for treatment, point to decreasing access to substance abuse treatment
for those that are likely most in need, thus placing an even greater burden on states to
provide adequate treatment. The internal task environment of states is dynamic, undergoing
changes with increases in financial resources, increased federal funding for prevention
activities, and an overall growth in government payrolls and administration expenditures.
However, no statistically significant changes in either type of states’ levels of goal
displacement have occurred between the two time periods or between any two consecutive
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years. This suggests that although states face increased external pressures to serve their
addicted populations, no greater or lesser levels of goal displacement have taken place.
Contrary to the internal task environment hypotheses, on administrative and financial levels,
the findings suggest that changes to states’ internal environments have improved their
positions to deliver effective treatment and, hence, minimize their levels of goal
displacement.
Not only are levels of goal displacement found to be stable, but treatment gaps and
dependence rates for alcohol are as well. The only anomalies revealed for drug dependence
rates and treatment gaps took place between 2001 and 2002. Rates for drug dependence
rose sharply between those two years as did percentages of persons in need of, but not in
receipt of, drug treatment, but these two aberrations are explained in the paragraphs that
follow in which limitations of the study are discussed.
Although performance measures remain relatively stable for the years examined, regional
differences are discerned among states’ performances. More variation in goal displacement
occurs within and between regions for drug delivery treatment than for alcohol, but variation
in volatility for the two types of goal displacement within and between regions is not
statistically significant.
Hawaii, California, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, and Kentucky are identified as states that
experience minimal level of goal displacement in their drug and alcohol delivery systems.
Rhode Island, Delaware, Montana, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Maryland are recognized
as having elevated levels of goal displacement. A visual evaluation of determining if the
value of each variable is above or below the national mean reveals that the most distinct
difference between the two sets of states occur with respect to proportion of the population
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that is uninsured. Of the states that exhibit the least displacement, all but Hawaii have rates
that are average or above that of the mean. However, all but one of the displacement-prone
states (Montana) reveal low rates of uninsured, four which are located in the northeast, a
region that is traditionally recognized as having a relatively high standard of living. Rhode
Island, Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts all experience above-average median
household incomes and insured populations, but as to why the region cannot adequately
meet the needs of their substance abusing is still open to speculation. That states’ responses
to their alcohol and drug problems are different as are the factors that influence the
corresponding levels of goal displacement prevents one from making inferences about
differences between the two sets of states.
The linear regression analyses reveal that although the two sets of independent variables
(T1 and T2) predict states’ levels of goal displacement with respect to both the delivery of
drug and alcohol treatment, they do not predict states’ stability or instability of goal
displacement levels. Although the purpose of this research is not to explain volatility but
rather goal displacement, the findings raise new questions as to what types of internal and
external environmental factors contribute to volatility, thus opening the door to further
investigations. As a direction, Wolf (1993) established negative correlations between public
agency volatility to political autonomy and leadership support.
Of the ten regression analyses, eight are found to be significant at either the 0.001 or 0.01
levels. The analyses do reveal a striking difference between the alcohol and drug categories
of goal displacement. Among the external task environment variables, the differences
suggest that health insurance is a factor in explaining alcohol goal displacement but not for
drug, and the predictive capability of the variable is contrary to what is hypothesized.
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Minimal levels of goal displacement are found among states with increases in uninsured
populations, thus implying that states respond to the needs of their populations. Medium
household income, of marginal significance in several models, is found to influence goal
displacement in both alcohol and drug delivery; however, its relationship contradicts what is
hypothesized, but no valid explanation for this can be provided. In 2002 but not in 2005,
infant morality rates and AIAN populations and are found to impact goal displacement with
respect to drug treatment but not alcohol. The findings of the AIAN variable suggest that
the absence or presence of the indigenous populations does not impact goal displacement in
the delivery of alcohol. Yet in the realm of drug treatment, lower levels of displacement are
revealed among states with larger AIAN populations in 2002, but by 2005 the strength of the
relationship is greatly diminished. Historically, alcohol has been the preferred substance of
abuse among the AIAN communities, but it is very likely that America’s growing meth and
prescription drug epidemics have leveled the playing field, making all ethnic groups equally
vulnerable to illicit drug abuse.
Differences between alcohol and drug treatment goal displacement are also evident
among the internal task environment variables. Government administration does not predict
goal displacement in drug treatment but does so for alcohol but only in 2002. Government
payroll is found to be of marginal significance, partially explaining the phenomenon for both
alcohol and drug treatment delivery, but the relationships of both bureaucracy variables to
goal displacement suggest that increases in the expenditures of governments are contributing
to reduced levels of goal displacement. The results also imply that the financial resources of
states have no effect on displacement in alcohol treatment but are conducive to reduced
levels of goal displacement in the delivery of drug treatment. Again, because of our nation’s
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“war on drugs” mentality yet laissez-faire attitude toward alcohol abuse, and because of the
financial costs that are incurred in combating drug abuse, these two findings come as no
surprise.
The impacts of internal task variables of alcohol and drug treatment gaps on goal
displacement are also distinct. Neither type of treatment gap has a significant effect on goal
displacement in the delivery of alcohol treatment yet both are for drug treatment, but the
effects are different between the goal displacement that is experienced in drug treatment and
that of alcohol, as well as changes that take place between the two time periods. Alcohol
treatment gaps are found to maximize and drug treatment gaps to minimize goal
displacement in the delivery of drug treatment in 2002, but not in 2005. As alluded to
earlier, the reduced explanatory power that both treatment gaps have on the level of drug
goal displacement, particularly when volatility is considered as a factor, suggests that in
responding to unmet drug treatment needs, states are better at serving the alcohol abusing
populations because the two addictions are generally mutually inclusive.
Perhaps the most dissimilar difference between alcohol and drug goal displacement is
found among the facility characteristic variables. Distributions of types of facilities do not
influence goal displacement in the delivery of drug treatment but do so in alcohol treatment
and in a negative manner. The relationship between free treatment and a state’s level of
drug goal displacement is also positive, but no such relationship is found with regards to
alcohol treatment. Likewise, increases in numbers of clients is conducive to goal
displacement in alcohol treatment but not so in drug treatment, thus signaling the
pervasiveness of alcohol abuse and the burden it puts upon health care systems.
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For parity laws, all three types have a positive connection to goal displacement but only
in the delivery of alcohol treatment and not drug and, oddly, only for 2002 but not 2005.
The difference between the two time periods with respect to alcohol treatment could be
attributed to changes that took place in states’ parity laws, but because this research does not
specify the year to which a state adopted or made changes to its current laws, this difference
is not within the realm of explanation. The correlation between performance of alcohol
treatment and not of drug treatment may again be explained by the commonness of alcohol
abuse. As noted earlier in Chapter 3, parity laws vary from state to state. Some states have
laws that allow for treatment of alcoholism but not all types of substance abuse. It can be
assumed that the least liberal laws will exclude illicit drug abuse. That the most rudimentary
of parity laws, mandated offering, was a stronger contributor to goal displacement than the
more comprehensive laws should be of concern to those state that have it.
Several variables are shown to have no effect on goal displacement. The two managed
care variables of percentage of facilities that operate under managed care contracts and
HMO penetration rates are not contributory to any of the models. The implication that
managed care has no effect on treatment delivery, and hence on goal displacement, is
noteworthy because previous research has demonstrated managed care to be this magnificent
tool that increases access to health care, which, therefore, should improve the effectiveness
of treatment. However, as was postulated earlier, increased presence of managed care does
not necessarily imply effectiveness, and here it is shown to have no effect on level of goal
displacement.
Although federal monies to the states have increased, the effects of block grant funding
for either prevention or treatment on goal displacement remain unchanged. Again, as
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suggested earlier, to throw money at a complex social problem such as substance abuse will
not necessarily result in its improvement. That the funding is federal grant monies,
essentially “free money” to the states, and that the discretionary guidelines to how it is to be
expended was not researched, the ways to which it is specifically used is unknown.
The last three variables that are not foretelling of goal displacement are proportion of
states’ populations that receive public aid, ratio of inpatient to outpatient treatment, and
proportion of facilities that receive public funding. The resulting nonsignificance of public
aid is surprising, given that all of the other external task environment variables provide some
level of contributory power to one or more of the regression models. One would think that
if the proportion of a state’s uninsured population and infant mortality rate affect goal
displacement, proportion of public aid recipients would also, but it does not.
For alcohol, the differences between the T1 and T2 models that include the volatility
measure are no different than the differences between the T1 and T2 models that exclude it.
Volatility does not predict goal displacement in either two of the years under study. This
reaffirms the stability of alcohol treatment delivery. However, the same is not found for the
same comparisons for goal displacement in the delivery of drug treatment. Percentage of
population uninsured has a significant but negative effect on goal displacement in 2005
where it had not been in 2002, but it is not a factor in either model when volatility is
considered as predictor. Similarly, numbers of clients treated has a positive effect on
displacement in the presence of volatility in 2002 that it does not have in 2005. Overall, the
findings indicate that states appear to be responding to the needs of their populations and the
pervasiveness of drug treatment volatility is diminishing.
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A critical limitation of this study is use of state-level financial and employment data to
infer a state agency’s internal task environment. As state agencies often operate
independently of one another, it is faulty to assume that such broad state-level characteristics
have a direct impact upon a specific agency’s level of goal displacement. As a bureaucratic
organization, does a state’s Department of Mental Health experience goal displacement? It
is very probable. However, measuring the phenomenon, as discussed in the beginnings of
this piece of research, is extremely difficult. More appropriate indicators of internal task
environment are the organizational structure of the agency itself, its financial resources, and
employment expenditures.
It is also erroneous to infer a state’s level of goal displacement based on its overall
performance of meeting the needs of its addicted populations. Although a state is
responsible for providing adequate health services to its populations, a whole host of factors
can impact performance in any one type of treatment facility, whether that be the non-profit,
for-profit, or the public sector. To attribute goal displacement to a sole sector, such as the
public sector as is implicitly hypothesized in this piece of research, when all contribute to a
state’s performance, and the possibility that non-profit and for-profits may experience it, is
flawed.
Interpretation of the findings must be made with caution. SAMHSA surveys are
voluntary in nature and point prevalent, providing a snapshot of a state’s substance abuse
factors at one moment in time. As independent entities, not all states have similar substance
abuse treatment systems, and those systems may change over time as well as reporting
requirements. Additionally, SAMHSA’s National Survey on Drug Use and Health data are
estimated and incorporate, as a base, decennial census data for population counts totals.
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Changes in survey methods have also been reported (DHS 2006). SAMHSA reported that in
2002 it began providing a thirty dollar financial incentive to respondents of its National
Survey on Drug Use and Health, and that this change was responsible for the substantial
differences between 2001 and 2002 prevalence rates, therefore making comparisons
ineffectual. However, because the incentive resulted in increases in all prevalence rates in
2001, treatment gaps and dependence rates alike, and because both rates were used to
construct the final performance measurement of each state, this methodological defect did
not weaken any findings as they related to goal displacement.
Regardless of whether or not future research will unquestionably uncover the extent to
which goal displacement occurs within states’ publicly operated treatment systems is not of
utmost consideration here. What is important is that the findings denote the verity that
certain internal and external task environment factors are predictive of states’ success or
failure in meeting the needs of their substance abusing populations, and that the factors that
influence the effective or ineffective delivery of treatment are vastly different for alcohol
than they are for drug. Although rarely a number one priority on a state’s administrative
agenda, addressing illicit drug use and abuse is much more of a policy-driven issue than for
it is for alcohol. A website article addressing states’ drug policies (www.drugstrategies.org)
claimed that some states have made substance abuse a primary concern, as did New
Mexico’s Governor Johnson in 2001 in the reformation of drug policies. In 2001 Idaho
passed legislation that created new funding to expand treatment and rehabilitation services,
and in 2000, the Western Governors’ Association adopted a “Drug Policy in the West”
resolution that utilized professionals to aid association states in developing strategic plans to
curb substance abuse (www.drugstrategies.org). Perhaps it is a regional initiative such as
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this that accounts for the western regions enhanced delivery performances. Because of
government’s level of commitment to substance abuse, the other noteworthy implication is
that many other state characteristics such as government leadership, states’ outcome
assessment requirements, and the influence of interest groups should be points of departure
for further investigation (Wolf 1993; Rosenbloom and et al. 2006).
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Appendix A: Dependent Variables and Source of Data
Variable Name

drugDEPC06
drugGAP06
alcoDEP06
alcoGAP06

Variable Label

Table

Source

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Dependence or
Abuse

B.18
pgs 162-163

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Treatment Gap

B.21
pgs 168-169
B.16
pgs 158-159

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Dependence or
Abuse

B.18
pgs 166-167

drugGAP05

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap

B.21
pgs 172-173

alcoDEP05

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Treatment Gap

B.16
pgs 162-163

Wright, D. & Sathe, N. & Spagnola. K. 2007. State Estimates of Substance
Use from the 2004-2005 Survey on Drug Use and Health
DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 07-4235, NSDUH Series H-31 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k5State/pdf/2k5State.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 3/05/08

B.22
pgs 174-175

drugDEPC04

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Dependence or
Abuse

B.18
pgs 158-159

drugGAP04

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap

B.21
pgs 164-165

alcoDEP04

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Treatment Gap

B.16
pgs 154-155

alcoGAP04

DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 08-4311, NSDUH Series H-33 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k6State/pdf/2k6State.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 3/05/08

B.22
pgs 170-171

drugDEPC05

alcoGAP05

Wright, D. & Sathe, N. & Spagnola. K. 20078. State Estimates of
Substance Use from the 2005-2006 Survey on Drug Use and Health

B.22
pgs 166-167
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Wright, D. & Sathe, N. 2006. State Estimates of Substance Use
from the 2003-2004 Survey on Drug Use and Health
DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4142, NSDUH Series H-29 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k4State/pdf/2k4State.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 3/05/08

Variable Name

Variable Label
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Dependence or
Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Treatment Gap

Table

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Dependence or
Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse
Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Treatment Gap

A.15
pgs 110-111

A.19
pgs 118-119

drugDEPC01

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Alcohol Dependence or Abuse

B.15
pgs 146-147

drugGAP01

Total Percent of State Population Reporting
Past Year Any Illicit Drug Treatment Gap

B.18
pgs 152-153

drugDEPC03

drugGAP03
alcoDEP03
alcoGAP03

drugDEPC02
drugGAP02
alcoDEP02
alcoGAP02

Source

B.16
pgs 138-139
B.19
pgs 144-145
B.14
pgs 135-135

Wright, D. & Sathe, N. 2005. State Estimates of Substance Use
from the 2002-2003 Survey on Drug Use and Health
DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 05-3989, NSDUH Series H-26 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k3State/2k3SAE.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 3/05/08

B.20
pgs 146

A.18
pgs 116-117
A.13
pgs 106-107
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Wright, D. 2004. State Estimates of Substance Use from the 2002
Survey on Drug Use and Health
DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 04-3907, NSDUH Series H-23 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k2State/PDFW/2k2SAEW.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 1/06/08

Wright, D. 2003. State Estimates of Substance Use from the 2001
Survey on Drug Use and Health
DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3775, NSDUH Series H-19 Rockville, MD,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NHSDA/2k1State/PDF/2k1SAEv1.pdf
SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies
Retrieved 11/12/07

Appendix B: Tranformed Variables
Transitionary Dependent Variable Calculated Directly from Raw Data Published by SAMHSA
State Estimates of Substance Use from the National Surveys on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
Variable Name
PerfALC06

PerfDRG06
PerfALC05
PerfDRG05

PerfALC04
PerfDRG04

PerfALC03
PerfDRG03

PerfALC02
PerfDRG02

Variable Label
State alcohol performance
2006
State drug performance
2006

Formula
p = (estimated[1] 06 alcohol treatment gap – 06 alcohol treatment gap mean) – (observed 06 alcohol
dependence rate – 06 alcohol dependence rate mean)
p = (estimated 06 drug treatment gap – 06 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 06 drug dependence rate – 06
drug dependence rate mean)

State alcohol performance
2005
State drug performance
2005

p = (estimated 05 alcohol treatment gap – 05 alcohol treatment gap mean) – (observed 05 alcohol dependence
rate – 05 alcohol dependence rate mean)
p = (estimated 05 drug treatment gap – 05 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 05 drug dependence rate – 05
drug dependence rate mean)

State alcohol performance
2004
State drug performance
2004

p = (estimated 04 alcohol treatment gap – 04 alcohol treatment gap mean) – (observed 04 alcohol dependence
rate – 04 alcohol dependence rate mean)
p = (estimated 04 drug treatment gap – 04 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 04 drug dependence rate – 04
drug dependence rate mean)

State alcohol performance
2003
State drug performance
2004

p = (estimated 03 alcohol treatment gap – 03 alcohol treatment gap mean) – (observed 03 alcohol dependence
rate – 03 alcohol dependence rate mean)
p = (estimated 03 drug treatment gap – 03 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 03 drug dependence rate – 03
drug dependence rate mean)

State alcohol performance
2002
State drug performance
2004

p = (estimated 02 alcohol treatment gap – 02 alcohol treatment gap mean) – (observed 02 alcohol dependence
rate – 02 alcohol dependence rate mean)
p = (estimated 02 drug treatment gap – 02 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 02 drug dependence rate – 02
drug dependence rate mean)

PerfDRG01

State drug performance
p = (estimated 06 drug treatment gap – 06 drug treatment gap mean) – (observed 06 drug dependence rate – 06
2001
drug dependence rate mean)
[1] All calculated performance measures take into account published estimates from SAMHSA’s
"State Estimates of Substance Use from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health"
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Final Dependent Variables
Variable Name
OvAllALC
OvAllDRG
ConsistALC
ConsistDRG

Variable Label
Overall State Alcohol Performance
The mean for years 2002-2006
Overall State Drug Performance for years
The mean for years 2001-2006
Consistency of Alcohol Performance
2002-2006
Consistency of Drug Performance
2001-2006

Formula
The mean of all years for PerfALC, n = 5
(PerfALC02 + PerfALC03 + PerfALC04 + PerfALC05 + PerfALC06)/5
The mean of all years for PerfDRG, n = 6
(PerfDRG01 + PerfDRG02 + PerfDRG03 + PerfDRG04 + PerfDRG05 + PerfDRG06)/6
Standard Deviation of OvAllALC as calculated by Excel STDEV function
Standard Deviation of OvAllDRG as calculated by Excel STDEV function

Independent Variables
Variable Name
EXP/REV05

Variable Label
Formula
Total State Revenues/Total Expenditures
Total State and Local Revenue/Total State and Local Expenditures
2005-06
GOVTAdm05
Per Capita Gov't Administration,
Total Government Administration (Financial, Judicial and Legal, General Public Buildings, &
2005-06
Other) / estimated 2005 population per 1000*
GOVTEmpl05
Per Capita Full-Time Equivalent Gov't
Full-Time Equivalent Employees / Estimated 2005 population per 1000
Employees per 1000, 2005-06
GOVTPyrl05
Per Capita Gov't Payroll in Dollars
Total March Payroll / Estimated 2005 population per 1000
per 1000, 2005-06
REV/EXP00
Ratio of Total State Revenues to
Total State and Local Revenue/Total State and Local Expenditures
Expenditures 1999-2000
GOVTAdm00
Per capita Government Administration
Total Government Administration (Financial, Judicial and Legal, General Public Buildings, &
1999-2000
Other) / estimated 2000 population per 1000)
GOVTEmpl02
Per Capita Full-Time Equivalent
Full-Time Equivalent Employees / Estimated 2002 population per 1000
Gov't Employees per 1000, 2002
GOVTPyrl02
Per Capita Gov't Payroll in Dollars
Total March Payroll / Estimated 2002 population per 1000
per 1000, 2002
* All population estimates were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates 2000-2007
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2007-01.xls
Retrieved 6/10/08
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Appendix C: T1 Independent Variables and Dependent Variables
Variable
Name

Variable Label

STATE
MHHInc02

U.S. State
Median Household Income 2002

W/OIns00

% pop. Without Insurance 1998-2000
Table 147, pg 420

IMR01

Infant Mortality Rate 2001

PubAid00

Public Aid Recipients as % of Population 2000
Table A-81, pg 111

AIAN00

Amer Ind/Alaska native as % pop, 2000
GCT-P6. Race and Hispanic or Latino: 2000

PNP02

%distribution PNP 2002
Table 5.3b, pgs 68-69
Percent distribution of Private Non-Profit

PFP02

%distribution PFP 2002
Table 5.3b, pgs 68-69
Percent distribution of Private For-Profit

Source
U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Community Survey
http://www.2010census.biz/acs/www/Products/Ranking/2002/R07T040.htm
Retrieved 7/17/08
National Center for Health Statistics "Health, United States, 2006"
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf
Retrieved 5/9/08
U.S. Center of Disease Control - CDC Wonder
http://wonder.cdc.gov/lbd.html
Retrieved 7/23/08
U. S. Census State and Metropolitan Area Data Book: 2006, 6th Ed.
www.census .gov/prod/2006pubs/smadb/smadb-06.pdf
Retrieved 1/03/08
U. S. Census Bureau American Fact Finder GCT-P6 Race and Hispanic or Latino:
2000
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y& geo_id= 01000US&_box_head_nbr=GCT-P6&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=US-9
Retrieved 2/14/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 1/06/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 1/06/08
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Variable
Name

Variable Label

Source

PUB02

%distribution PUB 2002
Table 5.3b, pgs 68-69
Combined Percent distribution of Private

PubFd02

% of facilities that rec. public funds for SAT programs
2002
Table 5.15, pgs 100-101
Combined % distribution of Local, County, or
Community Government and State Government
Funding
(excludes Federal and Tribal Government)
% of facilities that treat at no charge 2003
Table 6.16b, pg 126-127

U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002 Data
on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 1/06/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002 Data on
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08

NoChrg03

HMO00

% of pop enrolled in HMOs 2000
Table 146, pg 419

MCContr02

% of facilities w/MC agrmts/contracts, 2002
Table 6.3b, pgs 94-95

CLIENTS02

Total Clients in treatment per 100,000, age 18 and over
2002
Table 5.20, pgs 114-115

U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2003 Data on
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-24, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 04-3966, Rockville, MD, 2004
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/03nssats/nssats_rpt_03.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
National Center for Health Statistics "Health, United States, 2006"
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf
Retrieved 05/09/2008
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002 Data on
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002 Data on
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
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Variable
Name

Variable Label

Source

IN/OP02

Ratio of Median # of Inpatient to Outpatient clients 2002
Table 5.8, pgs 80-81
Total Residential + Total Hospital/Total Outpatient

BGPrv00

Block Grant funds per capita on prevention activities,
2000
Appendix A: FY 2000, pg 783

U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002 Data on
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2006. "Inventory of State Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Activities and Expenditures".
Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President (Pub. No. NCJ 216918)

BGTrtmt00

Block Grant funds per capita on treatment activities,
2000
Appendix C: FY 2000, pg 789

Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2006. "Inventory of State Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Activities and Expenditures".
Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President (Pub. No. NCJ 216918)

REV/EXP00

Ratio of Total State revenues to expenditures 99/00

GOVTAd00

Per capita gov't administration 99/00

U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate00.html
states M – W
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/00 slss1.xls
states A – M
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/00slss2.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08
U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate00.html
states M – W
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/00 slss1.xls
states A – M
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/estimate/00slss2.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08
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Variable
Name

Variable Label

Source

GOVTEmply02

Per Capita FTE Gov’t Employees per 1000, 2002

GOVTPyrl02
Region
PARITY

Per Capita Gov't Payroll per 1000, 2002
Region of the U.S.
Parity

MMBenf

Min mandated benefits

MNOff

Mandated offering

OvAllALC

Mean Alcohol Performance for 2002-2006

U.S. Census Bureau
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/02stall.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08
U.S. Census Bureau
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/02stall.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08
As classified by the U.S. Census Bureau
Martin, G. No date. National Council of State Legislators. "Policy Matters. Critical
Issues in Healthcare Access. Substance Abuse Parity. State Actions”.
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/pmsap.pdf
Retrieved 4/12/08
Martin, G. No date. National Council of State Legislators. "Policy Matters. Critical
Issues in Healthcare Access. Substance Abuse Parity. State Actions”.
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/pmsap.pdf
Retrieved 4/12/08
Martin, G. No date. National Council of State Legislators. "Policy Matters. Critical
Issues in Healthcare Access. Substance Abuse Parity. State Actions”.
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/pmsap.pdf
Retrieved 4/12/08
calculated

OvAllDRG

Mean Drug Performance for 2001-2005

calculated

ConsistALC

Consistency of Alcohol Performance 2002-2006

calculated

ConsistDR

Consistency of Drug Performance 2001-2006

calculated

118

APPENDIX D: T2 Independent Variables
Variable Name

Variable Label

Source

MHHInc05

median HH income 2005
R2001

W/OIns04

% w/o insurance 2002-2004
Table 147, pg 420

IMR04

Infant Mortality Rate 2004

PubAid03

Public Aid Recipients as % of population 2003
Table A-81, pg 111

AIAN04

Amer Ind/Alaska native as % pop, 2004
Table A-5, pg10

PNP05

%distribution PNP 2005
Table 6.5b, pgs 102-103
Percent distribution of Private Non-Profit

PFP05

%distribution PFP 2005
Table 6.5b, pgs 102-103
Percent distribution of Private For-Profit

U.S. Census Bureau, American Fact Finder
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GRTSelectServlet?ds_name=
ACS_2005_EST_G00_&_lang=en&_ts=233555490515
Retrieved 7/17/08
National Center for Health Statistics "Health, United States, 2006"
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf
Retrieved 05/09/2008
U.S. Center of Disease Control - CDC Wonder
http://wonder.cdc.gov/lbd.html
Retrieved 7/23/08
U. S. Census State and Metropolitan Area Data Book: 2006, 6th Ed.
www.census .gov/prod/2006pubs/smadb/smadb-06.pdf
Retrieved 6/03/08
U. S. Census State and Metropolitan Area Data Book: 2006, 6th Ed.
www.census .gov/prod/2006pubs/smadb/smadb-06.pdf
Retrieved 6/03/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
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Variable Name

Variable Label

Source

PUB05

%distribution PUB 2005
Table 6.5b, pgs 102-103
Combined % distribution of Local, County, or
Community Government and State Government
Funding
(excludes Federal and Tribal Government)
% of facilities that rec public funds for SAT programs
2005
Table 6.16, pgs 134-135

U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
National Center for Health Statistics "Health, United States, 2006"
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf
Retrieved 05/09/2008
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2002
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-19, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3777, Rockville, MD, 2003
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/02nssats/nssats2002report.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08

PubFd05

NoChrg05

% of facilities that treat at no charge 2005
Table 6.14b, pgs 128-129

HMO05

% of pop enrolled in HMOs 2005
Table 146, pg 419

MCContr05

% of facilities w/MC agrmts/contracts, 2005
Table 6.3b, pgs 94-95

CLIENTS05

Total Clients in treatment per 100,000, aged 18 and over
2005
Table 6.28, pgs 168-169
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Variable Name
IP/OP05

Variable Label
Ratio of Median # of Inpatient to Outpatient clients 2005
Table 6.9, pgs 112-113
Total Residential + Total Hospital/Total Outpatient

BGPrv03

Block Grant funds per capita on prevention activities,
2003
Appendix A: FY 2003, pg 783
Block Grant funds per capita on treatment activities, 2003
Appendix C: FY 2003, pg 789

BGTrtmt03

REV/EXP05

Ratio of Total State revenues to expenditures 05/06

GOVTAd05

Per capita gov't administration 2005-06

GOVTEmply05

Per Capita FTE Gov’t Employees per 1000, 2005-06

GOVTPyrl05

Per Capita Gov't Payroll per 1000, 2005-06

Source
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, SAMHSA
National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2005
Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities.
DASIS Series: S-34, DHHS Pub. No. (SMA) 06-4206, Rockville, MD, 2006
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/05nssats/nssats2k5web.pdf
Retrieved 3/05/08
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2006. "Inventory of State Substance
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Activities and Expenditures”.
Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President (Pub. No. NCJ 216918)
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2006. "Inventory of State Substance
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Activities and Expenditures”.
Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President (Pub. No. NCJ 216918)
U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate06.html
States N – W
States A – M
Retrieved 6/08/08
U.S. Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate06.html
States N – W
States A – M
Retrieved 6/08/08
U.S. Census Bureau
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/05stall.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08
U.S. Census Bureau
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/05stall.xls
Retrieved 6/08/08

121

Appendix E: State Rankings for Alcohol and Drug Treatment Performance and Volatility
Alcohol
Treatment
Performance
Worst 51
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20

south dakota
montana
alaska
rhd island
washington
colorado
massachu
nebraska
wisconsin
minnesota
new mexico
indiana
maryland
delaware
north dako
maine
wyoming
connecticu
south caro
north caro
iowa
missouri
ohio
michigan
new hampsh
vermont
virginia
west virgi
new york
kansas
new jersey
distrColum

Volatility of
Alcohol
Performance
-0.3733
-0.3513
-0.2493
-0.1913
-0.1613
-0.1421
-0.1353
-0.1233
-0.1213
-0.1213
-0.0973
-0.0973
-0.0893
-0.0573
-0.0493
-0.0493
-0.0453
-0.0413
-0.0393
-0.0293
-0.0193
-0.0093
-0.0013
0.0047
0.0067
0.0227
0.0267
0.0287
0.0527
0.0567
0.0567
0.0667

south dakota
alaska
massachu
kentucky
new mexico
rhd island
utah
maine
maryland
north dako
hawaii
arkansas
missouri
distrColum
texas
nevada
colorado
virginia
minnesota
alabama
new hampsh
west virgi
south caro
kansas
wyoming
iowa
arizona
indiana
washington
illinois
louisana
connecticu

0.3655
0.3084
0.3067
0.2771
0.2623
0.2550
0.2462
0.2383
0.2363
0.2274
0.2151
0.2116
0.2105
0.2085
0.1980
0.1961
0.1904
0.1852
0.1797
0.1731
0.1629
0.1614
0.1607
0.1586
0.1499
0.1390
0.1361
0.1356
0.1325
0.1296
0.1294
0.1259

Drug
Treatment
Performance
Worst 51
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
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distrColum
rhd island
alabama
delaware
massachu
new york
new jersey
virginia
wisconsin
kansas
montana
ohio
michigan
south caro
maryland
illinois
west virgi
arkansas
north caro
connecticu
louisana
new hampsh
wyoming
pennsylvan
indiana
georgia
south dako
vermont
mississipp
florida
nevada
nebraska

-0.4759
-0.1742
-0.1142
-0.1109
-0.1059
-0.0825
-0.0509
-0.0509
-0.0475
-0.0459
-0.0442
-0.0425
-0.0392
-0.0375
-0.0359
-0.0309
-0.0259
-0.0209
-0.0175
-0.0142
-0.0142
-0.0109
-0.0092
0.0041
0.0075
0.0075
0.0091
0.0125
0.0208
0.0291
0.0308
0.0341

Volatility of
Drug
Performance
distrColum
alaska
rhd island
alabama
louisana
west virgi
connecticu
virginia
kansas
hawaii
utah
arizona
washington
delaware
oklahoma
new mexico
south caro
kentucky
new jersey
minnesota
south dako
wyoming
nevada
florida
oregon
indiana
michigan
new hampsh
new york
wisconsin
massachu
nebraska

0.2282
0.1843
0.1798
0.1573
0.1559
0.1439
0.1414
0.1369
0.1358
0.1318
0.1240
0.1228
0.1172
0.1170
0.1131
0.1084
0.1033
0.1002
0.0926
0.0905
0.0882
0.0866
0.0858
0.0830
0.0823
0.0822
0.0817
0.0805
0.0761
0.0738
0.0728
0.0710

19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Best 1

nevada
louisana
oklahoma
arkansas
oregon
utah
kentucky
georgia
illinois
pennsylvan
mississipp
alabama
florida
arizona
tennessee
idaho
california
hawaii
texas

0.0687
0.0687
0.0687
0.0767
0.0767
0.0767
0.0827
0.1007
0.1147
0.1147
0.1227
0.1247
0.1247
0.1247
0.1507
0.1507
0.1627
0.1967
0.2647

georgia
north caro
montana
oklahoma
pennsylvan
vermont
nebraska
new jersey
oregon
idaho
mississipp
delaware
new york
ohio
michigan
florida
tennessee
california
wisconsin

0.1257
0.1118
0.1085
0.1048
0.1000
0.0945
0.0831
0.0813
0.0748
0.0726
0.0724
0.0673
0.0646
0.0601
0.0584
0.0487
0.0485
0.0465
0.0450
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19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Best 1

tennessee
texas
new mexico
utah
colorado
minnesota
kentucky
north dakota
idaho
washington
oregon
oklahoma
missouri
arizona
california
hawaii
iowa
maine
alaska

0.0391
0.0391
0.0408
0.0408
0.0408
0.0458
0.0458
0.0525
0.0541
0.0725
0.0808
0.0808
0.0841
0.0875
0.0975
0.1058
0.1108
0.1225
0.2008

iowa
mississipp
tennessee
california
montana
colorado
maine
north dakota
idaho
arkansas
ohio
pennsylvan
north caro
vermont
georgia
missouri
texas
maryland
illinois

0.0696
0.0614
0.0600
0.0600
0.0589
0.0589
0.0585
0.0580
0.0570
0.0563
0.0545
0.0541
0.0529
0.0509
0.0437
0.0358
0.0309
0.0306
0.0306

